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Abstract
We survey the empirical literature on corporate ﬁnancial restruc-
turing, including breakup transactions (divestitures, spinoﬀs, equity
carveouts, tracking stocks), leveraged recapitalizations, and leveraged
buyouts (LBOs). For each transaction type, we survey techniques, deal
ﬁnancing, transaction volume, valuation eﬀects and potential sources
of restructuring gains. Many breakup transactions appear to be a
response to excessive conglomeration and attempt to reverse a poten-
tially costly diversiﬁcation discount. The empirical evidence shows that
the typical restructuring creates substantial value for shareholders.
The value-drivers include elimination of costly cross-subsidizations
characterizing internal capital markets, reduction in ﬁnancing costs for
subsidiaries through asset securitization and increased divisional trans-
parency, improved (and more focused) investment programs, reduction
in agency costs of free cash ﬂow, implementation of executive compen-
sation schemes with greater pay-performance sensitivity, and increased
*This monograph updates Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) with new data and research devel-
opments. It was in part written while Thorburn was a Visiting Professorial Fellow at the
Australian Business School at University of New South Wales.
monitoring by lenders and LBO sponsors. Buyouts after the 1990s on
average create value similar to LBOs of the 1980s. Recent developments
include consortiums of private equity funds (club deals), exits through
secondary buyouts (sale to another LBO fund), and evidence of per-
sistence in fund returns. LBO deal ﬁnancing has evolved toward lower
leverage ratios. In Europe, recent deals are ﬁnanced with less leveraged
loans and mezzanine debt and more high-yield debt than before. Future
research challenges include integrating analyses across transaction
types and ﬁnancing mixes, and producing unbiased estimates of the
expected return from buyout investments in the presence of limited
data on portfolio companies that do not return to public status.
1Introduction
Shocks to the corporate economic environment may give rise to severe
organizational ineﬃciencies. For example, a vertically integrated ﬁrm
may ﬁnd that long-term contracts and/or spot market purchases of
a key input have become more eﬃcient. Or increased general capi-
tal market liquidity may have rendered internal capital markets a rel-
atively costly divisional funding mechanism for conglomerates. High
leverage may be optimal as ﬁnancial innovations and expertise make it
less expensive to manage ﬁnancial distress. Financial innovations and
general market liquidity may also render it optimal to securitize an
entire division. The result is increased divisional managerial focus. In
this monograph, we collectively refer to the transactions that imple-
ment these and other changes in asset composition, ﬁnancial contract-
ing, and ownership structure as “corporate restructuring”.
We focus the survey on two broad groups of corporate restructuring
procedures: corporate breakups and highly leveraged transactions. Cor-
porate breakups include techniques to sell oﬀ and/or securitize part of
the ﬁrm. They include divestitures, spinoﬀs, equity carveouts, and, for
a brief period, tracking stock. Highly leveraged transactions involve a
signiﬁcant increase of debt in the ﬁrm’s capital structure, either through
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a debt-ﬁnanced special dividend in a leveraged recapitalization, or in
a leveraged buyout (LBO), in which the entire ﬁrm is acquired by a
ﬁnancial buyer (a buyout fund).
In order to limit the scope of the survey, we do not review recap-
italizations that do not involve extensive use of leverage. Examples
include state privatizations (Megginson and Netter, 2001), conversions
from mutual to stock companies (Masulis, 1987), and stock repurchases
(Kalay and Lemmon, 2008). Moreover, for a review of the broader lit-
erature on corporate takeovers and takeover bidding involving strategic
buyers, see Betton et al. (2008). Also, we address distressed restructur-
ing only tangentially (Hotchkiss et al., 2008; Senbet and Wang, 2012).
As surveyed below, corporate restructuring may be initiated by top-
level management, by divisional managers, or by outside sponsors like
buyout funds. Occasionally, the restructuring is defensive, arising in
response to a control threat from the market for corporate control.
Regardless of who initiates the transaction, the parties are likely seek-
ing to improve operating eﬃciency, increase cash ﬂow, and ultimately,
enhance ﬁrm proﬁtability. In breakup transactions, the evidence sug-
gests that assets are transferred to higher-value users, while highly
leveraged transactions involve optimizing capital structure, improving
managerial incentives and achieving tax eﬃciency.
The monograph is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
so-called diversiﬁcation discount and the potential costs of diversiﬁca-
tion, which seem to motivate many breakup transactions. Chapters 3
through Chapter 6 then detail the frequency, structure, and economic
eﬀect of various types of breakup transactions, beginning with divesti-
tures (Chapter 3), spinoﬀs (Chapter 4), equity carveouts (Chapter 5),
and ending with tracking stock (Chapter 6). Next, we review highly
leveraged transactions, including leveraged recapitalizations (Chap-
ter 7), and we provide an extensive discussion of the empirical evidence
on LBOs (Chapter 8). Chapter 9 concludes the monograph.
2Restructuring and the Boundary of the Firm
2.1 Breakups and the “Conglomerate Discount”
The economic boundary of the ﬁrm may be deﬁned as the point where
within-ﬁrm transactions start to become more costly than arms-length
(across market) transactions. There are numerous theories for why
within-ﬁrm transactions may economically dominate market transac-
tions, ranging from transactions costs (Coase, 1937) to agency costs
and costs of imperfect contracting and moral hazard.1
Alternatives to outright ownership of resources include renting
(long- or short-term contracts) and “spot” market transactions to
ensure continued operations of the ﬁrm. These organizational alter-
natives have diﬀerent implications for corporate taxes, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
resource specialization and development of appropriable quasi-rents
(which in turn lead to bargaining issues and potential for opportunistic
behavior), investment decisions, risk sharing, and ﬁnancing costs.
An asset such as an operating plant may have greater value as a
division of a conglomerate than as a stand-alone “pure play” entity. As
1See, e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1985), Grossman
and Hart (1986), Jensen (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990).
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emphasized by Maksimovic and Phillips (2007), implicit in the belief
that conglomerates create value is the idea that industries diﬀer materi-
ally in the skills and resources which are required to operate eﬃciently,
and that this diversity of operating environments aﬀects the cost of
performing transactions within the ﬁrm. These costs could be due to
ﬁnancial externalities across industries, such as improved risk sharing
within the ﬁrm, or real externalities that could arise due to the use of
a shared factor of production.
The value of using shared resources, such as managerial time and
internal capital, diﬀers across ﬁrms and industries as well as through
time as the boundaries of the ﬁrm change. For example, Comment and
Jarrell (1995) document an increase in corporate focus in the 1980s.
They show that 56% of exchange listed ﬁrms had a single business
segment in 1988 compared to 38% in 1979. Breakup transactions create
value when such synergies from conglomeration become negative, i.e.,
when the costs of keeping the company’s assets together exceed the
beneﬁts from doing so.
The corporate ﬁnance literature on diversiﬁcation took oﬀ with the
discovery of the “conglomerate discount” by Lang and Stulz (1994) and
Berger and Ofek (1995). The discount is measured as the diﬀerence
between the market value of the diversiﬁed ﬁrm and the sum of the
estimated values of the (non-traded) divisions. The latter are estimated
using multiples from single-segment (“pure play”) competitors. Berger
and Ofek (1995) report a diversiﬁcation discount of 13–15% for US
publicly traded ﬁrms in the 1986–1991 period.
Internationally, Lins and Servaes (1999) analyze publicly traded
ﬁrms from Germany, Japan, and the UK in 1992 and 1994. They report
a signiﬁcant discount of 10% in Japan and 15% in the UK, but do not
ﬁnd evidence of a discount in Germany. Their study suggests that,
for Japan, the conglomerate discount only appears for ﬁrms with a
strong Keiretsu aﬃliation. Fauver et al. (2003) study more than 8,000
ﬁrms from 35 countries and ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial, legal, and regula-
tory environments each have an important inﬂuence on the value of
diversiﬁcation.
Empirical research has extended and reinterpreted the early results
on the conglomerate discount. Lamont and Polk (2002) and Campa and
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Kedia (2002) make the point that, since ﬁrms endogenously choose to
diversify, exogenous variation in diversiﬁcation is required to draw infer-
ences about its causal eﬀect on ﬁrm value. Lamont and Polk (2002) ﬁnd
that exogenous changes in corporate “diversity” (deﬁned as the within-
ﬁrm dispersion of industry investment) are negatively related to ﬁrm
value. Thus, they argue that diversiﬁcation destroys value. However,
Campa and Kedia (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low value are more likely
to diversify. Controlling for this self-selection, the diversiﬁcation dis-
count drops and sometimes turns into a premium.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) conclude that diversiﬁed ﬁrms pre-
dominantly behave like value maximizers, given their productivity and
that internal capital markets tend to facilitate the eﬃcient transfer
of resources. However, they also point to ambiguities reﬂecting econo-
metric issues of endogeneity and self-selection, as well as choice of data
and industry classiﬁcations, at various steps of the overall test strategy.
They further conclude that “there is some evidence that conglomerate
ﬁrms that are busted up had investment patterns that varied from the
neoclassical model” (p. 472). A sample of diversiﬁed ﬁrms that divested
one or more divisions is more likely to be facing signiﬁcant diversiﬁca-
tion costs than a random sample of conglomerates.
The literature on breakup transactions provides several examples
of diversiﬁcation costs and how they may distort investment. Scharf-
stein and Stein (2000) describe conditions under which top management
ineﬃciently allocates too much funds to divisions with poor invest-
ment opportunities (cross-subsidization). Rajan et al. (2000) argue that
investment choices may be distorted because top management cannot
commit to future distribution of funds until a surplus has been realized.
Goldman (2004) models the resource allocation inside a multidivision
ﬁrm of a manager with stock-based compensation, and shows that the
investment incentives improve after a spinoﬀ of a division.
Another potential cost of diversiﬁcation is related to executive com-
pensation: the division being a private entity, it is diﬃcult to tie divi-
sional manager compensation directly to the underlying value of the
operations under their control. Stock-based compensation policies may
be critical to induce optimal investment decisions, and to retain man-
agerial talent in a competitive labor market. A separate listing of
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subsidiary stock resolves such compensation issues, lowering agency
costs and increasing market value.2
Yet another motivation for breakup transactions is that conglomer-
ation accentuates information asymmetries between investors and cor-
porate insiders. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) model a diversiﬁed ﬁrm’s
decision to divest a division that is undervalued by the market. Outside
investors observe the aggregated (conglomerate) cash ﬂow only, while
management also observes the divisional cash ﬂows. Without detailed
divisional information, the market rationally assigns an average perfor-
mance to each division. This pooling results in undervaluation of the
well-performing division and overvaluation of the poorly performing
division. In this situation, it may be optimal to divest the overvalued
(underperforming) division in order to lower the cost of capital for the
undervalued division.
A related information-based argument is that conglomerates oper-
ating in a wide range of industries are more diﬃcult for analysts to
value. This is true both because analysts tend to specialize in certain
industries and because divisions may be relatively opaque in terms of
ﬁnancial information. A breakup may lead to increased analyst fol-
lowing and improved quality of the information available to investors.
Liu (2005) also argues that a breakup allows outsiders to discover ﬁrm
value at a lower cost. He presents an equilibrium in which high-value
ﬁrms break up to separate themselves from low-value ﬁrms, predicting
a positive market reaction to breakup announcements.
The breakup motivations discussed above are all consistent with
ﬁrm value maximization. However, Boot (1992) argues that self-
interested managers are reluctant to sell assets because a divestiture
may signal poor managerial quality. He claims that there are too few
divestitures in reality, compared to the level that is optimal for share-
holder wealth. Boot (1992) proposes that corporate control transactions
play a critical role in enforcing more divestitures, for example by forc-
ing managers to sell a “crown jewel” to prevent a takeover of the ﬁrm.
Lang et al. (1995) also argue that managers value control and won’t sell
assets to promote operating eﬃciency alone. They suggest that assets
2See Aron (1991) for a model of this eﬀect in the context of spinoﬀs.
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are sold only when the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained and a divestiture
is the least expensive way to raise capital.
These arguments emphasize how breakups create value by reversing
negative synergies. However, a divisional or asset sale may also be the
result of the demand side: the assets may simply be worth more under
the buyer’s control. That is, the buyer may be a higher-quality manager
and the divisional resources may oﬀer a greater potential for synergies
when merged with the acquiring ﬁrm. Also, corporate breakups may be
forced by regulatory actions such as antitrust or by bankruptcy court.
2.2 Highly Leveraged Transactions
In a highly leveraged transaction, the focus of the restructuring is on the
economic eﬀects of the leverage increase. As discussed further below,
whether undertaking a debt-ﬁnanced dividend (leveraged recap), or a
leveraged purchase of a division or the entire ﬁrm (LBO, where the
ﬁrm goes private), it is primarily the leverage increase rather than any
concomitant asset restructuring that provides the economic motivation
for the transaction. As a result, LBOs tend to involve ﬁnancial (as
opposed to strategic) buyers, such as buyout funds.
The literature points to several possible sources of gains in leverage-
increasing transactions. Under the classical trade-oﬀ theory of debt,
ﬁrms move to a higher level of debt in order to capitalize on the cor-
porate debt tax shield provided by the (U.S.) tax law.3 In addition to
the potential for corporate tax beneﬁts, the literature emphasizes ben-
eﬁcial managerial incentive and monitoring eﬀects of higher leverage.
Some highly leveraged ﬁrms may also gain a strategic advantage in
product markets. On the other hand, high leverage is not for everyone:
under conditions of ﬁnancial distress, a debt overhang tends to prevent
eﬃcient investments (Myers, 1977).
In terms of managerial incentives, Ross (1977) presents a signal-
ing model in which managers who face personal bankruptcy costs sig-
nal their private information about higher future expected cash ﬂows
by committing to a greater corporate debt level. In the vernacular of
3Frank and Goyal (2008) and Parsons and Titman (2008) review corporate leverage policies.
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Jensen (1986), entrenched managers prefer to overinvest rather than
pay out the ﬁrm’s “free cash ﬂow” as dividends (where free cash ﬂow is
deﬁned as corporate liquid funds in excess of what is required to fund
all positive net present value projects).
A leveraged recapitalization, where the ﬁrm increases its debt with-
out retaining the proceeds (thus increasing leverage ratios), reduces
Jensen’s overinvestment problem by precommitting to disgorge future
cash ﬂows in the form of interest payment. Jensen (1986) further argues
that the greater risk of ﬁnancial distress associated with higher lever-
age also helps discipline managerial investment policies. Stulz (1990)
formalizes this intuition and shows that high leverage is particularly
valuable when investment opportunities are poor, even if the free cash
ﬂow is negative.
Increasing leverage also allows wealth constrained managers to hold
a greater percentage of total equity after the transaction is completed.
For example, in a leveraged recapitalization, the debt may be paid out
as cash dividend to non-managerial stockholders and as a stock divi-
dend (or a cash dividend that is immediately reinvested in the ﬁrm) to
managers. In an LBO, the managers may roll over their equity invest-
ment, while other equity holders are paid out, again increasing man-
agers’ fractional equity ownership. The incentive eﬀect of such greater
managerial equity ownership helps reduce manager–shareholder con-
ﬂicts of interest. Garvey (1992, 1995) explores the conditions under
which leverage and management equity ownership are complementary
in reducing the overinvestment problem of free cash ﬂow.
Highly leveraged transactions may also lead to improved monitoring
by banks, and by the LBO sponsor who has its own money at risk in
the transaction. Jensen (1989) argues that active governance by buy-
out sponsors and high-powered managerial incentives, combined with
the pressure from high leverage, provides an incentive structure that is
superior to that of public ﬁrms with dispersed ownership and weak gov-
ernance. He suggests that the LBO organizational form may “eclipse”
the traditional corporate form, a prediction that has yet to be proven
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009).
Moreover, highly leveraged transactions may cause wealth trans-
fers across the ﬁrm’s various constituencies. For example, bonds that
2.2 Highly Leveraged Transactions 169
lack protective covenants may become more junior in the capital struc-
ture, resulting in a bondholder loss (beneﬁting shareholders). It is also
possible that incumbent managers participating in a leveraged buyout
have inside information about the ﬁrm’s future prospects, expropri-
ating selling shareholders. Muller and Panunzi (2004) argue that the
LBO sponsor may be in a position to expropriate minority shareholders
by merging the ﬁrm with the raider’s leveraged acquisition subsidiary.
Perotti and Spier (1993) present a model in which the ﬁrm gains bar-
gaining power in contracting renegotiations by temporarily increasing
leverage. Speciﬁcally, after retiring equity through a junior debt issue,
shareholders threaten to underinvest in valuable new projects unless
employees concede to wage reductions. Finally, there is a growing litera-
ture linking leverage to the ﬁrm’s strategic position in product markets.
See Maksimovic (1995) and Parsons and Titman (2008) for reviews of
this literature.
We now turn to a detailed description of the empirical evidence on
breakups and highly leveraged transactions. In the course of discussing
the evidence, we return to several of the hypotheses outlined above.
3Divestitures
A divestiture is the sale of a portion of the ﬁrm’s assets to a third
party — typically another company or a buyout fund — in a private
transaction. The assets that are sold may be a division, segment, sub-
sidiary, or product line. In return, the seller typically receives cash,
but sometimes also securities or a combination of both. The proceeds
from the sale are reinvested in the remaining business or distributed to
the ﬁrm’s claim holders. While eliminating a fraction of its assets, the
selling ﬁrm continues to exist in essentially the same form as before.
Divestitures may trigger a substantial tax liability: the diﬀerence
between the proceeds from the sale and the ﬁrm’s tax basis in the assets
is a capital gain or capital loss, which is taxed at the corporate tax rate.
3.1 Transaction Volume
In 2011, U.S. corporations announced 2,919 divestitures with a total
deal value of $320 billion (source: Mergerstat Review). 377 of these
transactions had a deal value exceeding $100 billion, while 71 transac-
tions had a value of $1 trillion or more. The line in Panel A of Figure 3.1
shows the annual number and the bars show the annual dollar volume
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of U.S. divestitures over the period 1980–2011. The number of transac-
tions was relatively stable between 1980 and 1995. Since the mid-1990s,
however, the divestiture activity tripled and reached record high levels
in 2005–2006. After a drop in deal activity through the ﬁnancial crises,
the level of divestitures recovered quite well in 2010 and 2011.
The most aggressive U.S. divesters of subsidiaries and divisions in
2011 was General Electric (12 divestitures), followed by Bank of Amer-
ica (11), Exxon Mobil (11), Citigroup (10), and asset management ﬁrm
The Carlyle Group (11). Two of these sellers — General Electric and
Citigroup — were also among the most aggressive divesters in 2010. In
addition, General Electric was on the Mergerstat Review list of aggres-
sive buyers in 2011, with 27 acquisitions.
The total divestiture activity tracks closely the merger and acquisi-
tion (M&A) activity in the economy. Panel B of Figure 3.1 shows the
annual number of U.S. divestitures as a percentage of all U.S. takeovers
from 1970 and forward. While the number of divestitures increased
sharply in the second half of the 1990s, it fell behind the even greater
increase in M&A volume over the same period. This trend was reversed
once the takeover activity slowed after the turn of the century. In 2011,
divestitures made up 31% of all M&A transactions, somewhat below
the annual average of 37% over the whole 1970–2011 period.
3.2 Valuation Eﬀects
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the stock price reaction of the divesting ﬁrm
for 24 studies of divestiture announcements in the period 1963–2005.
The studies generally report the cumulative abnormal stock return
(CAR) over the two-day interval (−1,0) where day 0 is the announce-
ment day.1 More recent studies often include day +1 as well, to capture
1A typical approach is to estimate the parameters using a single-factor market model over
approximately a year prior to the event: Rjt = αj + βjRmt + jt, where Rjt is the stock
return of ﬁrm j and Rmt is the market return on day t. The abnormal return ARjτ
over event day τ is computed as ARjτ = Rjτ − (αˆj + βˆjRmτ ), where αˆj and βˆj are
the coeﬃcient estimates from the time series regression. The cumulative abnormal return
is CAR(τ1, τ2) = Σ
τ2
τ=τ1ARjτ , where τ1 and τ2 deﬁne the event window relative to the
announcement day 0.
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Table 3.1. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for divestiture announcement of 7,544
sellers and 2,300 buyers in 25 selected studies, 1963–2005.
Relative size is the average ratio of the sales price of the divested assets to the pre-deal
total assets (TA) and market value of equity (MVE) of the seller and buyer, respectively.
CAR Relative size
Sample Time Event
Study Mean Median TA MVE size period window
Panel A: Seller returns:
Alexander et al.
(1984)
0.3% 53 1964–1973 [−1,0]
Linn and Rozeﬀ
(1984)
1.6 % 77 [−1,0]
Rosenfeld (1984) 2.3% 62 1969–1981 [−1,0]
Jain (1985) 0.5% 1,062 1976–1978 [−1,0]
Klein (1986) 1.1% 202 1970–1979 [−2,0]
Hite et al. (1987) 1.5% 16% 114 1963–1981 [−1,0]
Hirschey and Zaima
(1989)
1.6% 170 1975–1982 [−1,0]
Hirschey et al. (1990) 1.5% 38% 75 1975–1982 [−1,0]
Afshar et al. (1992) 0.7% 10% 178 1985–1986 [−1,0]
Sicherman and Pettway
(1992)
0.9% 30% 278 1980–1987 [−1,0]
John and Ofek (1995) 1.5% 0.8% 39% 258 1986–1988 [−2,0]
Lang et al. (1995) 1.4% 0.7% 11% 69% 93 1984–1989 [−1,0]
Loh et al. (1995) 1.5% 59 1980–1987 [−1,0]
Slovin et al. (1995) 1.7% 0.7% 33% 17% 179 1980–1991 [0,1]
Hanson and Song
(2000)
0.6% 0.3% 27% 326 1981–1995 [−1,1]
Mulherin and Boone
(2000)
2.6% 1.6% 18% 139 1990–1999 [−1,1]
Clubb and Stouraitis
(2002)
1.1% 0.5% 14% 187 1984–1994 [−1,0]
Dittmar and Shivdasani
(2003)
3.4% 31% 188 1983–1994 [−1,1]
Kiymaz (2006) 3.2% 9% 205 1989–2002 [−1,1]
Benou et al. (2008) 0.9% 1,812 1981–2001 [−1,1]
Cao et al. (2008) 1.3% 668 1992–2003 [−1,1]
Francoeur and
Niyubahwe (2009)
0.6% 167 1990–2000 [−1,1]
Ataullah et al. (2010) 2.0% 14% 195 1992–2005 [−1,1]
Owen et al. (2010) 1.6% 0.6% 20% 797 1997–2005 [−1,1]
Sample-size weighted
seller average
1.2% 20% 27% 7,544 1963–2005
(Continued)
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Table 3.1. (Continued)
CAR Relative size
Sample Time Event
Study Mean Median TA MVE size period window
Panel B: Buyer returns:
Jain (1985) 0.5% 304 1976–1978 [−1,0]
Hite et al. (1987) 0.6% 19% 105 1963–1981 [−1,0]
Sicherman and
Pettway (1992)
0.5% 278 1980–1987 [−1,0]
Datta and
Iskandar-Datta
(1995)
0.0% 13% 63 1982–1990 [−1,0]
John and Ofek
(1995)
0.4% −0.5% 72% 167 1986–1988 [−2,0]
Hanson and Song
(2000)
0.5% 0.2% 326 1981–1995 [−1,1]
Kiymaz (2006) 0.8% 185 1989–2002 [−1,1]
Benou et al. (2008) 2.3% 872 1981–2001 [−1,1]
Sample-size
weighted buyer
average
1.2% 19% 25% 2,300 1963–2002
the eﬀect of an announcement after the closing of the stock exchange
or misreporting of the announcement date. The average CAR for the
announcements is positive — ranging from 0.3% to 3.4% across the
diﬀerent samples — and almost all of the estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-sided t-test against zero). The sample-
size-weighted average CAR for the combined sample of 7,544 divesti-
tures is 1.2%. In sum, the evidence indicates that the average divestiture
increases the value of the selling ﬁrm.
As further shown in the table, ﬁrms sell one-ﬁfth of their total
assets in the average transaction. Several studies ﬁnd that the seller
ﬁrm announcement returns are increasing in the relative size of the
divested assets (Zaima and Hearth, 1985; Klein, 1986; Mulherin and
Boone, 2000). It is possible that the returns on asset sales are inde-
pendent of the size of the assets, so that relatively larger assets have a
greater impact on the parent ﬁrm’s return. This is similar to the eﬀect
of the relative size of the target on bidder returns documented in the
takeover literature and reviewed in Betton et al. (2008).
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Klein (1986) reports that the disclosure of the sales price is central
to the market’s assessment of the transaction. She ﬁnds a positive
seller stock price reaction only when the price is disclosed at the initial
divestiture announcement. Firms that fail to announce the transaction
price have CARs close to zero. The signiﬁcance of price disclosure is
conﬁrmed by Afshar et al. (1992) and Sicherman and Pettway (1992).
Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) ﬁnd that the announcement returns tend
to increase with the diﬀerence between the sales price and an estimated
value of the assets in their current use. Overall, this suggests that the
market’s valuation of the transaction depends on the sales price relative
to the value of the assets when operated by the ﬁrm.
The abnormal returns on divestiture announcements are positive
also for buyers. For eight studies with data for the period 1963–2002 and
listed in Panel B, the average buyer announcement CAR ranges from
0.0% to 2.3%. The sample-size-weighted buyer average CAR (ACAR)
is 1.2% for the combined sample of 2,300 divestiture announcements.
Note, however, that the study by Benou et al. (2008) of 872 high-
tech divestitures in the period 1981–2001 generates much larger buyer
returns than prior studies. Excluding this study from the total sample
reduces buyer returns to a sample-size-weighted average of 0.5% —
still positive, but of a smaller magnitude than for sellers. Sicherman
and Pettway (1992) document a size eﬀect in the buyer’s stock price
reaction similar to that of sellers, i.e., buyer returns tend to increase
with the relative size of the acquired assets.
While both sellers and buyers appear to gain from a divestiture, the
division of the total gains depends on the relative bargaining strength
of the two parties. Sicherman and Pettway (1992) use a debt down-
grade prior to the asset sale as an indication of a weaker bargaining
position vis-a-vis the buyer. As expected, they ﬁnd signiﬁcantly lower
CARs for sellers whose debt was downgraded prior to the transaction.
Moreover, the value creation is conditional on the successful comple-
tion of the divestiture. Hite et al. (1987) show that the seller stock price
drops back to its initial level if a previously announced divestiture is
canceled. In addition, announcement returns are positive for buyers
completing the transaction, but insigniﬁcant for buyers in transactions
that subsequently fail.
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3.3 Drivers of Value Creation in Divestitures
The positive announcement returns for sellers and buyers indicate that
divestitures generally create value. We now turn to the evidence on the
potential reasons for this value creation.
3.3.1 Increase in Corporate Focus
The typical divestiture involves sales of assets that are outside of the
diversiﬁed ﬁrm’s core business, and it results in an increased focus of the
remaining operations. John and Ofek (1995) show that three-quarters
of divested segments are unrelated to the seller’s core business, deﬁned
as its primary four-digit Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) code.
Moreover, using various measures for ﬁrm focus, they ﬁnd that sellers
become more focused after the divestiture. Their focus measures include
a sales-based Herﬁndahl index across the ﬁrm’s business segments, the
total number of business lines reported by the ﬁrm, and whether the
divested division is outside the ﬁrm’s core business.
Schlingemann et al. (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to divest non-core
segments that are relatively small. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and
Kaplan and Weisback (1992) show that ﬁrms are more likely to sell
peripheral assets. Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001b) describe how Thorn
EMI successfully raised cash by selling unrelated assets, reinvesting
the proceeds in the company’s core business. In sum, divested assets
are typically outside the ﬁrm’s core business and the asset sales result
in an increased focus of the ﬁrm’s remaining operations.
An increase in corporate focus may create value if it allows manage-
ment to focus their attention on the core business and therefore run the
ﬁrm more eﬃciently. John and Ofek (1995) ﬁnd that the divestment
announcement returns are positively related to measures capturing the
increase in focus. Moreover, the operating proﬁtability of the remaining
assets increases after a divestiture, but only for the ﬁrms that become
more focused. Denis and Shome (2005) show that large ﬁrms downsiz-
ing their assets become more focused and increase their operating per-
formance. Berger and Ofek (1999) document average CARs of 7% for
focusing-related announcements by diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Overall, there is
substantial evidence that the value creation from divestitures is related
to the resulting increase in business focus of the divesting ﬁrm.
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3.3.2 Elimination of Negative Synergies
If the divested segment has negative synergies with other divisions of
the diversiﬁed ﬁrms, the divestiture will create value simply by elimi-
nating these negative synergies. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) exam-
ine the investment eﬃciency of divesting ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that the sale
of a business segment is associated with a reduction of the diversi-
ﬁcation discount. Moreover, they document signiﬁcant improvements
in the investment decisions of the ﬁrm’s remaining segments after the
divestiture. Speciﬁcally, the investment level increases for segments that
underinvest relative to single-segment ﬁrms and decreases for segments
that overinvest relative to their peers. They also ﬁnd that the announce-
ment returns are higher the greater the subsequent reduction in the
diversiﬁcation discount and the greater the improvement in segment
investments. Overall, their evidence suggests that divestitures create
value by reducing costly cross-subsidization of ineﬃcient investments
in the diversiﬁed ﬁrm.
Colak and Whited (2007) reach a very diﬀerent conclusion, address-
ing the endogeneity of breakup decisions. They conﬁrm that ﬁrms
selecting a divestiture or spinoﬀ are diﬀerent from their peers: the
ﬁrms that restructure are typically larger and more diversiﬁed, and are
in relatively fast-growing industries. Controlling for these diﬀerences,
they show that although spinoﬀs and divestitures are associated with
improved investment eﬃciency, these improvements are not directly
caused by the restructuring itself.
Kaplan and Weisback (1992) examine whether divestitures are evi-
dence of failed acquisitions. Studying a sample of 271 large ﬁrms
acquired between 1971 and 1982, they ﬁnd that 44% of the targets
were sold by the end of 1989. Only one-third of the divested seg-
ments are classiﬁed as failed acquisitions, however, based on account-
ing proﬁtability and comments by managers and the business press.
Kaplan and Weisback (1992) conclude that acquirers sell businesses
that they have improved or that they once had synergies with but no
longer do.2
2Fluck and Lynch (1999) model how ﬁrms make diversifying acquisitions to help ﬁnance
marginally proﬁtable projects, to subsequently divest these subsidiaries once the projects
are proﬁtable and can generate the necessary funds internally.
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3.3.3 Better Fit with the Buyer
As discussed above, a divestiture will create value if the assets are
worth more to the buyer than the value in their current use. A buyer
could, for example, have substantial synergies or superior management
skills. John and Ofek (1995) ﬁnd that seller announcement returns are
higher when the buyer has some comparative advantage in manag-
ing the assets, such as a buyer operating in the same industry as the
divested division or a leveraged buyout group.
Using U.S. Bureau of Census data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)
examine the eﬀect of asset sales on the productivity at the plant level.
They show that divestitures are more likely in business cycle upturns,
when the assets are less productive than industry benchmarks, when
the selling division is less eﬃcient than the buyer, and when the ﬁrm
has more eﬃcient divisions in other industries. They conclude that
most divestitures result in productivity gains by redeploying assets from
relatively low-productivity sellers to higher-ability buyers.
Datta et al. (2003) also study the eﬃciency of the reallocation of
assets in divestitures. They use Tobin’s q, deﬁned as the ratio between
the market value and the replacement cost (here the book value) of the
assets, as a proxy for management’s capability to manage the assets.
They ﬁnd that the announcement returns are highest for transactions
where the buyer has a relatively high q and the seller has a relatively
low q, possibly because the assets are transferred to a better managed
ﬁrm. Overall, the evidence suggests that divestitures create value by
transferring assets to higher-valuation buyers.
3.4 Corporate Governance
3.4.1 Agency Issues
Although a divestiture may be necessary to maximize shareholder
wealth, some incumbent managements resist parting from assets.
Berger and Ofek (1999) ﬁnd that the announcements of focus-increasing
transactions often are preceded by corporate control and incentive-
altering events, including management turnover, outside shareholder
pressure, changes in management compensation, and unsuccessful
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takeover attempts. Gillan et al. (2000) describe how Sears announced
the divestiture of ﬁnancial services and refocusing on retail ﬁrst after
a long period of poor performance and coincident with substantial
pressure from institutional investor activists. This suggests that the
restructuring may have been postponed until it could not be delayed
any longer.
Consistent with a reluctance to sell assets, the monitoring of and
incentives provided to top management are critical to the value created
by a divestiture. Tehranian et al. (1987) document signiﬁcantly higher
announcement returns for divesting ﬁrms that provide long-term per-
formance plans to their top executives. Hirschey and Zaima (1989) ﬁnd
higher announcement returns for divestitures by companies with con-
centrated ownership than sales by widely held ﬁrms. Also, the returns
are higher for ﬁrms where insiders are net-buyers of the ﬁrm’s stock over
the preceding six-month period. Hanson and Song (2000) further show
that divestiture gains are increasing in the fraction of outside directors
on the board and the percentage equity ownership of the management
team. Pointing to the importance of banks as monitors, Hirschey et al.
(1990) ﬁnd some evidence of higher announcement returns for divesti-
tures by ﬁrms with bank debt. Overall, ﬁrms with better monitoring
and more managerial share ownership seem to make divestiture deci-
sions that create more value.
The proceeds received by the divesting ﬁrm may be reinvested in
the ﬁrm’s remaining operations, used to retire debt, or distributed to
shareholders. Lang et al. (1995) and Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001a) show
that the announcement returns are positive when the proceeds are used
to pay back debt, but insigniﬁcant for ﬁrms that reinvest the proceeds.
Slovin et al. (1995) also ﬁnd higher announcement returns when the
proceeds are paid out. Ataullah et al. (2010) show that the shareholder
announcement returns increase with the shareownership of the CEO
for ﬁrms that retain the proceeds. This suggests that management may
employ the funds ineﬃciently if retained by the ﬁrm.
Bates (2005) examines the corporate payout and retention decision
for 400 large asset sales between 1990 and 1998. He ﬁnds that the prob-
ability of retaining the cash proceeds increases in the divesting ﬁrm’s
growth opportunities, measured by its market-to-book ratio. However,
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ﬁrms retaining the proceeds consistently overinvest (have higher cap-
ital expenditure) relative to their industry peers. Also, the higher the
equity ownership of oﬃcers and directors, the more likely is it that
the sale proceeds are paid out. The evidence is again consistent with
investment ineﬃciencies associated with the retention of proceeds from
asset sales.
3.4.2 Financial Distress
Several studies indicate that asset sales are used as a way of generating
cash when the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. Divestiture announce-
ments are typically preceded by a period of negative stock returns
(Alexander et al., 1984; Jain, 1985; Hanson and Song, 2003) and poor
operating performance (Lang et al., 1995; Schlingemann et al., 2002;
Brown et al., 1994). Moreover, ﬁrms with high leverage are more likely
to sell assets (Ofek, 1993; Kruse, 2002). Oﬃcer (2007) shows that
divesting ﬁrms have lower cash balances, cash ﬂow, and bond ratings
than size- and industry-matched control ﬁrms, all of which suggest that
the sellers are liquidity constrained. Also, Nixon et al. (2000) ﬁnd that
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms prefer a divestiture to a spinoﬀ, which does
not generate cash. In addition, Asquith et al. (1992), Ofek (1993), and
others show that ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress frequently sell assets as part
of the restructuring process.
The optimal use of proceeds from asset sales changes when the ﬁrm
is in ﬁnancial distress. The ﬁrm’s ability to pay dividends to sharehold-
ers is typically limited by debt covenants at this point, and the choice
stands between reinvestment in the business or repayment of debt. For
a sample of distressed ﬁrms, Brown et al. (1994) show that shareholder
announcement returns are signiﬁcantly higher when the proceeds are
retained by the ﬁrm rather than used to repay debt. Also as expected,
bondholder announcement returns are higher when the proceeds are
used to pay oﬀ debt. Brown et al. (1994) suggest that creditor inﬂuence
over distressed ﬁrms may force asset sales that beneﬁts the ﬁrm’s credi-
tors to the detriment of shareholders. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996)
ﬁnd that divestitures by ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms generate positive
announcement returns for bondholders, but not for shareholders.
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Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms sell
assets at depressed prices to lower-valuation industry outsiders because
higher-valuation industry insiders are liquidity constrained. Consistent
with this argument, Pulvino (1998) ﬁnds that ﬁnancially constrained
airlines sell aircrafts at lower prices than their unconstrained competi-
tors. Moreover, Oﬃcer (2007) shows that acquisition multiples are lower
when the parent ﬁrm has experienced negative abnormal stock returns
over the year leading up to the sale and when the corporate loan spread
above treasury rates is high. Also, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) show that
more specialized assets sell at greater discounts, and that discounts are
greater when assets are sold to industry outsiders than to industry
insiders. Examining ﬁrms auctioned in Swedish bankruptcy, however,
Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) reject the ﬁre-sale hypothesis: they ﬁnd
little evidence of ﬁre-sale discounts when assets are sold as going con-
cerns.3
Liquidity may be a factor in the decision to sell assets. Kim (1998)
documents that managers sell their most liquid assets ﬁrst, before sell-
ing more illiquid assets. Moreover, Mulherin and Boone (2000) and
Schlingemann et al. (2002) show that breakup transactions tend to
cluster in industries where the aggregate corporate transaction volume
is large, i.e., in industries with relatively liquid markets for corporate
assets.
3See Hotchkiss et al. (2008) for a more detailed review of asset restructurings by ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms.
4Spinoﬀs
In a spinoﬀ, a public company distributes its equity ownership in a
subsidiary to its shareholders. The distribution is a pro-rata dividend
and parent shareholders receive subsidiary stock in proportion to their
ownership in the parent ﬁrm. The spinoﬀ involves a complete separation
of the two ﬁrms. After the spinoﬀ, the subsidiary becomes a publicly
traded company with a unique ticker symbol and an independent board
of directors. In contrast to a divestiture, a spinoﬀ does not generate any
cash proceeds for the parent company. Also, since the spinoﬀ involves a
public listing of shares, it has higher transaction costs and takes longer
time than a divestiture.
A spinoﬀ may be structured as a tax free transaction if it quali-
ﬁes under Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code. Among the most
important requirements under Section 355 are (i) the parent must have
control of the subsidiary (own at least 80% of the voting rights) prior
to the distribution; (ii) the parent must distribute control (at least 80%
of the votes) to shareholders and retain no practical control of the sub-
sidiary; (iii) the spinoﬀ must have a valid business purpose; and (iv)
the parent or the subsidiary cannot be acquired within two years after
the spinoﬀ. If the spinoﬀ qualiﬁes under Section 355, there is no tax
182
4.1 Transaction Volume 183
on the distribution of stock, neither at the parent nor at the share-
holder level. Most spinoﬀs in the United States are structured as tax
free transactions.
If a spinoﬀ does not qualify under Section 355, however, the distri-
bution is taxed as a property dividend. The parent recognizes a gain
equal to the diﬀerence between the fair market value of the subsidiary
and the parent’s tax basis in the subsidiary, similar to a capital gain.
This imputed gain is taxed at the corporate tax rate. Moreover, share-
holders pay a dividend tax on the fair market value of the subsidiary
(the distributed subsidiary stock).
The condition under Section 355 requiring that the subsidiary is
not acquired within two years of the spinoﬀ is outside the parent com-
pany’s control. Yet, a potential acquisition of the subsidiary after a
tax free spinoﬀ would trigger an often substantial tax liability at the
parent company level. To transfer the cost of this potential liability to
the subsidiary and thus ultimately the acquirer, it is common practice
that the subsidiary contractually commits to pay any such future tax
liability of the parent, would the subsidiary be acquired within two
years of the spinoﬀ.
Maydew et al. (1999) compare 52 tax free spinoﬀs with 218 divesti-
tures during the period 1987–1995. They ﬁnd that tax costs average
8% of the divested assets. They suggest that managers prefer a taxable
assets sale when the sales price is high enough to oﬀset the associated
tax cost.
4.1 Transaction Volume
Using data from Thompson SDC Platinum (SDC), Figure 4.1 plots the
total deal value (bars) and annual number (line) of spinoﬀs announced
worldwide between 1985 and 2012.1 The number of spinoﬀs soared in
the second half of the 1990s, and reached a peak in year 2000 with
1Only 56% of the announced spinoﬀs are coded by SDC as completed. The rest are classiﬁed
largely as pending (27%), unknown (5%), or withdrawn (10%). Since many older spinoﬀs
are coded as still pending, we ignore the deal status and report statistics for all announced
spinoﬀs.
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Fig. 4.1 Annual volume of spinoﬀs worldwide, 1985–2012. Total transaction value of $ billion
and number of spinoﬀ announcements. (Source: SDC).
over 200 transactions and a total market value of $225 billion. Many
companies tried to take advantage of the higher-valuation multiple
investors were willing to pay for activities in the technology and inter-
net sector by splitting oﬀ subsidiaries and divisions in that space.
While the interest for spinoﬀs plummeted with the burst of the
internet bubble, the deal activity recovered through 2006 and 2007.
The spinoﬀ dollar deal volume fell again drastically with the onset of
the ﬁnancial crises and reached a trough in 2009, but has recovered
through 2010 and 2011. In 2012, there were a total of 172 spinoﬀs
announced globally for a combined value of $16 billion.
The largest U.S. transactions announced in 2012 were the spinoﬀs of
The WhiteWave Foods from Dean Foods ($1.9 billion), Liberty Spinco
from Liberty Media ($1.7 billion), and Sears Hometown and Outlet
Stores from Sears Holdings ($0.7 billion). Internationally, the largest
transactions were the spinoﬀ of the tire manufacturer Hankook Tire,
Korea ($5.4 billion); the separation of two mines in Sibanye Gold from
Gold Fields, South Africa ($1.1 billion); and the split of PetroBakken
Energy from Petrobank, Canada ($1.1 billion).
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4.2 Valuation Eﬀects
The results from 24 selected studies estimating shareholder gains from
spinoﬀ announcements are listed in Table 4.1. The samples contain
a total of 2,957 spinoﬀs announced between 1962 and 2007. Share-
holder average cumulative abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly positive
and ranges from 1.7% to 5.6% across the various studies. The low-
est average CAR of 1.7% is for a sample of 156 European spinoﬀs
announced in 1987–2000 and examined by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova
(2004). Combining the 24 studies, the sample-size-weighted abnormal
announcement return is 3.3%.
The average CAR of 3.3% in spinoﬀs is higher than the 1.2% average
CAR for divestitures reported above. Recall, however, that also buy-
ers tend to experience positive announcement returns in divestitures
(average CAR of 1.2%). In contrast, the total gains from a spinoﬀ are
reﬂected in the parent company stock. Thus, some of the diﬀerence
in announcement returns between spinoﬀs and divestitures could be
explained by buyers sharing in the value creation from the latter trans-
action.
Table 4.1 further shows that the market value of the subsidiary is
about one-quarter of that of its parent in the average spinoﬀ. As for
divestitures, the announcement returns for spinoﬀs are increasing in the
relative size of the subsidiary. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) show that
shareholder CARs are on average greater in spinoﬀs of subsidiaries
with a market value exceeding 10% of the parent company’s market
value compared to spinoﬀs of relatively small subsidiaries. In addition,
Alli et al. (2001) ﬁnd insigniﬁcant announcement returns for 47 spinoﬀs
that are subsequently withdrawn, as if the market anticipates the with-
drawal at the time of the announcement. See also Harris and Madura
(2011) for more recent evidence on withdrawn spinoﬀs.
The evidence of positive announcement returns for spinoﬀs is com-
pelling. Some studies also report long-term returns following spinoﬀs.
Cusatis et al. (1993) estimate the buy-and-hold stock returns for par-
ents and subsidiaries spun oﬀ in the 1965–1988 period. They ﬁnd posi-
tive average returns for holding periods of 24 and 36 months compared
with portfolios of industry-and size-matched stocks. McConnell et al.
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Table 4.1. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 2,957 spinoﬀs in 24 selected studies,
1962–2007.
Relative size is the ratio of the market value of equity of the spun oﬀ subsidiary and the
parent company prior to the spinoﬀ.
CAR Relative size
Sample Time Event
Study Mean Median Mean Median size period window
Miles and Rosenfeld
(1983)
3.3% 10% 55 1963–1980 [0,1]
Hite and Owers (1983) 3.3% 7% 123 1963–1981 [−1,0]
Schipper and Smith
(1983)
2.8% 20% 93 1963–1981 [−1,0]
Rosenfeld (1984) 5.6% 35 1969–1981 [−1,0]
Vijh (1994) 2.9% 2.1% 29% 18% 113 1964–1990 [−1,0]
Allen et al. (1995) 2.1% 94 1962–1991 [−1,0]
Slovin et al. (1995) 1.3% 1.6% 33% 24% 37 1980–1991 [0,1]
Daley et al. (1997) 3.4% 1.4% 85 1975–1991 [−1,0]
Best et al. (1998) 3.4% 72 1979–1993 [−1,0]
Desai and Jain (1999) 3.8% 29% 18% 144 1975–1991 [−1,1]
Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999)
3.1% 1.9% 31% 14% 118 1979–1993 [−1,0]
Mulherin and Boone
(2000)
4.5% 3.6% 22% 14% 106 1990–1999 [−1,1]
Gertner et al. (2002) 3.9% 2.2% 24% 19% 160 1982–1996 [−1,0]
Wruck and Wruck
(2002)
3.6% 172 1985–1995 [−1,0]
Burch and Nanda
(2003)
3.7% 3.2% 24% 20% 106 1979–1996 [−2,1]
Maxwell and Rao
(2003)
3.6% 2.6% 25% 19% 80 1976–1997 [−1,0]
Seoungpil and Denis
(2004)
4.0% 3.1% 25% 17% 150 1981–1988 [−1,1]
Veld and
Veld-Merkoulova (2004)
1.7% 0.6% 156 1987–2000 [−1,0]
McNeil and Moore
(2005)
3.5% 25% 23% 153 1980–1996 [−1,1]
Qian and Sudarsanam
(2007)
4.8% 2.6% 157 1987–2005 [−1,1]
Veld and
Veld-Merkoulova (2008)
3.1% 2.6% 21% 91 1995–2002 [−1,1]
Chemmanur et al.
(2010)
2.2% 139 1990–2000 [−1,1]
Harris and Madura
(2011)
2.5% 1.9% 472 1984–2007 [−1,1]
Jain et al. (2011) 4.9% 46 1986–2005 [−1,1]
Sample-size weighted
average
3.3% 26% 18% 2,957 1962–2007
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(2001) investigate portfolios of parents and subsidiaries in 89 spinoﬀs
between 1989 and 1995. In contrast to the earlier work, they ﬁnd little
evidence of higher average buy-and-hold returns compared to portfolios
matched on size and book-to-market. Also, using the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model as a benchmark, they reject the hypothesis
that portfolios of spinoﬀ companies exhibit abnormal returns. Klein
and Rosenfeld (2010) show that “sponsored” spinoﬀs, where an outside
investor purchases a substantial equity stake in the newly created ﬁrm
around the spinoﬀ date, perform worse than “conventional” spinoﬀs
over a three-year period following the transaction.
4.3 Drivers of Value Creation in Spinoﬀs
4.3.1 Increased Corporate Focus
As with divestitures, a potential source of value creation in spinoﬀs is
the increase in corporate focus resulting from the elimination of unre-
lated divisions. Daley et al. (1997) report that the positive announce-
ment returns are limited to spinoﬀs that increase corporate focus,
deﬁned as the parent and subsidiary having diﬀerent two-digit SIC
industry codes. They document substantial improvements in the return
on assets for parents in focus-increasing spinoﬀs, but not for parents
where the spun oﬀ subsidiary is in a related industry. Moreover, Desai
and Jain (1999) ﬁnd that focus-increasing spinoﬀs have signiﬁcantly
higher announcement returns, long-run abnormal stock returns, and
improvements in operating performance than do non-focus increasing
spinoﬀs.
Burch and Nanda (2003) estimate the change in the parent ﬁrm’s
diversiﬁcation discount from the year prior to the year after the spinoﬀ.
They ﬁnd that the diversiﬁcation discount is reduced when the spinoﬀ
increases corporate focus, but not otherwise. Overall, the evidence sug-
gests that shareholder gains in spinoﬀs are associated with a subsequent
increase in ﬁrm focus.
Jain et al. (2011) investigate ﬁrms’ decision to vertically disintegrate
through a spinoﬀ or an equity carveout. They ﬁnd that the likelihood
of vertical disintegration increases with positive subsidiary industry
demand shocks and ﬁnancing conditions, and decreases with parent
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ﬁrm relative productivity. They ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive announce-
ment returns for parent ﬁrms, their rivals, and subsidiary supplier ﬁrms,
suggesting that vertical divestitures result in eﬃciency gains to parent
ﬁrms due to enhanced focus.
Dittmar (2004) examines the capital structure choice of spun oﬀ
ﬁrms and their former parents. She shows that subsidiary debt levels
are closer to (although still higher than) that of their industry rivals.
Moreover, small subsidiaries with high growth opportunities have lower
leverage ratios, while large subsidiaries with high collateral value have
higher leverage ratios than do their parents. Thus, it appears that a
spinoﬀ allows the spun oﬀ entities to adopt a more suitable capital
structure.
4.3.2 Elimination of Negative Synergies
The separation of an unrelated business segment may further reduce
any negative synergies that exist between the subsidiary and the rest of
the ﬁrm. Gertner et al. (2002) examine whether spinoﬀs help eliminate
value-reducing cross-subsidization in diversiﬁed ﬁrms. They show that
the subsidiary’s investment decisions become much more sensitive to
the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities after the spinoﬀ. Speciﬁcally, the
total capital expenditure decreases for ﬁrms in low Tobin’s q industries
and increases for ﬁrms in high q industries. These changes take place
primarily for subsidiaries whose operations are unrelated to the parent’s
core business and in spinoﬀs generating higher announcement returns.
Ahn and Denis (2004) further ﬁnd that, prior to the spinoﬀ, parent
ﬁrms trade at a discount to and invest less in their high-growth (high q)
divisions than do their stand-alone peers. Following the spinoﬀ, how-
ever, the diversiﬁcation discount is eliminated and investments have
increased for the high-growth segments. Also, McNeil and Moore (2005)
show that subsidiary capital expenditures move toward industry levels
after the spinoﬀ, both for previously rationed and subsidized divisions.
Announcement returns are greater when parent ﬁrms previously allo-
cated capital in a seemingly ineﬃcient way, deﬁned as rationing high
q and subsidizing low q spun oﬀ divisions, as is the reduction in the
diversiﬁcation discount.
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Using plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database,
Chemmanur and Nandy (2009) show that total factor productivity of
plants remaining with the parent ﬁrm increases on average immediately
after the spinoﬀ. This productivity improvement can be attributed to
cost savings and remains for the following ﬁve years. Overall, the evi-
dence indicates that spinoﬀs create value by improving the investment
decisions in diversiﬁed ﬁrms.2
Allen et al. (1995) propose that spinoﬀs provide a way to unwind
unsuccessful prior acquisitions. They examine a sample of 94 spinoﬀs in
which the spun oﬀ entity previously had been acquired by the parent
ﬁrm. Their evidence suggests that the original acquisition was value
destroying: the average acquisition announcement return is negative
both for the acquirer and for the target and bidder combined. Moreover,
the spinoﬀ announcement return is positive and negatively correlated
to the acquisitions return, i.e., the greater the anticipated loss from
the acquisition, the larger the expected gain from the spinoﬀ. While
not identifying a unique source for the value creation in spinoﬀs, these
results are consistent with the elimination of negative synergies between
the parent and the subsidiary.
4.3.3 Wealth Transfer from Bondholders
A spinoﬀ may increase shareholder value at the expense of the parent
ﬁrm’s creditors by reducing the total assets of the ﬁrm. Also, if the
spinoﬀ increases the volatility of the cash ﬂows of the two separate ﬁrms
the expected payoﬀ to debtholders will decrease, with a corresponding
gain to shareholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976). MacMinn and Brockett
(1995) further argue that a spinoﬀ could transfer wealth from liability
claimants by removing corporate assets from their reach. Neverthe-
less, the impact of a spinoﬀ on debtholders is limited by the existence
of restrictive debt covenants. Hite and Owers (1983) ﬁnd insigniﬁcant
bondholder abnormal returns for a sample of 31 spinoﬀ announcements
in 1963–1981, as do Schipper and Smith (1983). For a more recent
2See also Fulghieri and Sevilir (2011) for a model of ﬁrms in industries with high human
capital intensity, showing that multidivisional ﬁrms can improve employee incentives to
innovate through a spinoﬀ.
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sample from the period 1995–2002, Veld and Veld-Merkulova (2008)
ﬁnd small but signiﬁcantly positive average bondholder returns around
the spinoﬀ announcement of 0.1% (median 0%).
In a case study of Marriott, however, Parrino (1997) documents a
signiﬁcant drop in the value of Marriott’s bonds following its spinoﬀ
announcement. At the same time, shareholder announcement returns
were positive, suggesting a wealth transfer from bondholders. Maxwell
and Rao (2003) examine monthly bond return data for a sample of
80 spinoﬀs between 1976 and 1997. They ﬁnd that parent bondhold-
ers tend to experience a price decline after the spinoﬀ announcement.
The average abnormal bond return (adjusted for the treasury rate) in
the month of the spinoﬀ is −0.9%, and decreasing in the relative size
of the spun oﬀ subsidiary. Consistent with a bondholder loss, credit
ratings are more likely to be downgraded than upgraded subsequent to
the spinoﬀ. They ﬁnd, however, that the combined value of the pub-
licly traded debt and equity increases, suggesting that a wealth transfer
from bondholders could only explain part of the shareholder gains.
4.3.4 Information Asymmetries
The aggregation of ﬁnancial data across divisions may exacerbate
informational asymmetries between outside investors and insiders for
diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) examine
whether spinoﬀs reduce such information gaps, using the dispersion
in analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ forecast error as a measure for the
information asymmetry. They ﬁnd that spinoﬀs are more common for
ﬁrms with relatively high levels of information asymmetry compared
to their industry rivals. The announcement returns are higher for ﬁrms
with a greater degree of information asymmetry, and the information
gap tends to decrease after the spinoﬀ. Best et al. (1998) also ﬁnd
that spinoﬀ announcement returns are increasing in ﬁnancial analysts’
earnings forecast errors. Overall, this suggests that one source of value
creation in spinoﬀs is the mitigation of information asymmetries.
Analysts play an important role in producing and disseminating
information about the ﬁrm. Gilson et al. (2001) study changes in the
coverage by ﬁnancial analysts for a sample of 103 focus-increasing
spinoﬀs and equity carveouts over 1990–1995. They document a 45%
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increase in analysts coverage in the three years following a breakup.
The new analysts tend to be specialists in the subsidiary’s industry.
Moreover, the accuracy of the earnings forecast improves by 30–50%,
and in particular for the industry specialists. In sum, increases in cor-
porate focus seem to improve the information provided by analysts,
both in quality and quantity.
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) further show that analysts tend to
revise upward their short-term earnings forecast in response to a spinoﬀ.
Also, idiosyncratic stock return volatility increases following a spinoﬀ,
and more so when the spun oﬀ subsidiary is unrelated to the parent
ﬁrm. They conclude that the stock price becomes more sensitive to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, which beneﬁts informed traders relative to
uninformed traders.3
4.3.5 Clientele Eﬀects
Previously combined into a single security, the spinoﬀ creates an
opportunity to hold the subsidiary stock separately. This expansion
of investors’ opportunity set increases liquidity and opportunities for
investor diversiﬁcation. In a sample of 113 spinoﬀs during 1964–1990,
Vijh (1994) ﬁnds abnormal stock returns of 3.0% on the spinoﬀ ex-date,
i.e., the day that the subsidiary starts trading separately, accompanied
by an increased trading volume. He attributes the positive returns to
higher demand for the parent and subsidiary stocks once they have
been separated.
Abarbanell et al. (2003) show that institutional investors rebal-
ance their portfolio holdings in parents and their spun oﬀ subsidiaries
dependent on the fund’s investment style and ﬁduciary restrictions.
However, they ﬁnd little evidence that such rebalancing trades lead
to abnormal price pressures for parents or subsidiaries around the
spinoﬀ. Chemmanur and He (2007) examine the trading of institu-
tional investors in 66 spinoﬀs between 1999 and 2004. They ﬁnd large
imbalances in the post-spinoﬀ trading of parent and subsidiary stock:
46% of the trades are in the opposite direction and trades in the same
3See also Chemmanur and Liu (2011) for a model where the increased information produc-
tion by institutional investors aﬀects ﬁrms’ choice of breakup transaction.
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direction are heavily concentrated in one of the ﬁrms. This imbalance
increases in the measure of information asymmetry and the diﬀerence
in beta risk and growth rates between the parent and subsidiary. See
also Bardong et al. (2008) for evidence on the market microstructure
environment for spinoﬀs. Overall, spinoﬀs seem to relax a trading con-
straint that existed prior to the distribution of the subsidiary stock.
4.3.6 Increased Probability of a Takeover
The fact that it is now possible to acquire control of the division through
a stock purchase increases the likelihood that the division will become
a future takeover target. The spinoﬀ may also increase the probability
that the parent will become a target as the parent is now a smaller and
more focused ﬁrm. Cusatis et al. (1993) examine 146 tax free spinoﬀs
over the period 1965–1988 and show that both the parent and the
spun oﬀ subsidiary are indeed more likely to become takeover targets,
compared to a set of control ﬁrms matched on size and industry. They
suggest that the two pure plays created by a spinoﬀ are more attractive
as targets than the combined company. Most of the takeovers occur
two to three years after the spinoﬀ, possibly to protect the tax free
status of the spinoﬀ. Given the large premiums typically paid in control
transactions, they attribute the positive abnormal stock returns at the
time of the spinoﬀ to the increased probability of being acquired. This
inference is supported by Harris and Glegg (2008), who ﬁnd that cross-
border spinoﬀ announcements are higher when the subsidiary is located
in a country with a more active takeover market.
Chemmanur and Yan (2004) formalize this idea in a model where
all shareholders beneﬁt if incumbent management loses control of a
division to a more able rival. A spinoﬀ forces the manager either to
work harder in running the ﬁrm or to relinquish control of one of the
ﬁrms resulting from the spinoﬀ. Either outcome leads to an increase in
the combined equity value of the two ﬁrms resulting from the spinoﬀ.
4.4 Corporate Governance
Self-interested managers may be reluctant to downsize assets under
their control. Ahn and Walker (2007) study the importance of eﬀective
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corporate governance for ﬁrms’ decision to spin oﬀ a subsidiary. Their
sample is 102 spinoﬀs between 1981 and 1997. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms
conducting a spinoﬀ have greater stock ownership by outside board
members, and smaller and more heterogeneous boards relative to their
peers. Following the spinoﬀ, parent ﬁrms increase their market-to-book
ratios and reduce the diversiﬁcation discount. They conclude that eﬀec-
tive governance increases the likelihood of a spinoﬀ, which is a value-
increasing strategy.
Wruck and Wruck (2002) examine the management team of the
spun oﬀ subsidiary. They show that 21% of spinoﬀ top managers are
outsiders, while 48% of the insiders are parent company top managers
rather than division heads. They argue that subsidiary managers lack
the corporate governance expertise required when the former division
becomes publicly traded. Announcement returns are highest for spun
oﬀ subsidiaries led by a parent ﬁrm top manager and a division head,
combining corporate governance and operating expertise.
In a spinoﬀ, the parent management can design the governance
structure of the subsidiary without seeking approval from sharehold-
ers. Daines and Kausner (2004) ﬁnd that the charters of spun oﬀ
subsidiaries include substantially more takeover defenses than do the
charters of a sample of size- and industry-matched IPO ﬁrms, where
shareholders have a say on the corporate charter. Moreover, the spun
oﬀ ﬁrms tend to have more takeover protection than do their parents.
Chemmanur et al. (2010) ﬁnd that parent ﬁrms with more antitakeover
provisions have signiﬁcantly higher announcement returns and greater
improvements in operating performance after the spinoﬀ. While these
ﬁrms tend to reduce the number of antitakeover provisions after the
spinoﬀ, the unit that the CEO continues to run has more antitakeover
provisions than the other ﬁrms resulting from the spinoﬀ. See also
Harris and Madura (2010) for evidence on poison pill adoptions by
spun oﬀ subsidiaries. Overall, it appears that managers prefer more
takeover defenses than shareholders do.
Pyo (2007) ﬁnd that pay-performance sensitivity increases for
subsidiary CEOs after a spinoﬀ. The higher the pay-performance
sensitivity, the greater the improvements in operating performance
post-spinoﬀ. Seward and Walsh (1995) propose that the likelihood of
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becoming a takeover target should be higher for spun oﬀ ﬁrms with lit-
tle CEO equity incentives. They ﬁnd that the takeover probability —
hostile as well as friendly — increases with the CEO’s stock and option
ownership in the spun oﬀ subsidiary. While not discussed by Seward
and Walsh (1995), it is possible that CEOs with relatively low pay-
performance sensitivity also adopt more takeover defenses in the spun
oﬀ ﬁrm.
Allen (2001) examines the post-spinoﬀ trades of senior managers,
directors, and blockholders in 193 public subsidiaries and their parents
over the period 1978–1991. He ﬁnds that insiders who trade during the
ﬁrst year following the spinoﬀ earn excess returns of 36% over the sub-
sequent 12-month period. He suggests that insiders take advantage of
the spinoﬀ as an opportunity to use private information on the relative
prospects of the parent and the subsidiary.
4.5 Splitoﬀs
A splitoﬀ is similar to a spinoﬀ in that the subsidiary becomes an inde-
pendent company with a separate stock listing. The splitoﬀ, however,
involves an exchange oﬀer, where shareholders are oﬀered to exchange
parent company stock for subsidiary stock. Thus, the splitoﬀ eﬀectively
resembles a stock repurchase, where the parent company buys back its
own shares using subsidiary stock as consideration. As a result of the
exchange oﬀer, the ownership structure in the parent and the subsidiary
is diﬀerent post-splitoﬀ (depending on the extent to which parent share-
holders participate in the exchange oﬀer). Similar to a spinoﬀ, a splitoﬀ
does not generate any new cash to the parent company. The tax treat-
ment is also the same as for a spinoﬀ.
Splitoﬀs are rare, partly because the valuation of the subsidiary
stock is critical for the exchange oﬀer. A splitoﬀ is therefore always pre-
ceded by an equity carveout, which helps establish the market value of
the subsidiary stock. High-proﬁle splitoﬀs include McDonald’s splitoﬀ
of 51% of its interest in Chipotle Mexican Grill, announced in April
2006 and valued at $660 million; Viacom’s splitoﬀ of Blockbuster in
2004; and General Motors splitoﬀ of Hughes Electronics in 2003. In
May 2011, Cargill Inc. completed a splitoﬀ worth $14.9 billion of its
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majority stake in Mosaic Co. Furthermore, Liberty Media Corp. (for-
mer Liberty CapStarz Inc.) was split oﬀ from Liberty Interactive Corp.
in September 2011.
We are unaware of any systematic empirical evidence on splitoﬀs —
reﬂecting the limited number of transactions.4 Given the similarity with
spinoﬀs, the research on spinoﬀs is likely relevant for splitoﬀs as well. In
addition, there may be some value created in splitoﬀs from the repur-
chase of parent stock, for example by signaling that the parent stock is
undervalued (Kalay and Lemmon, 2008).
4For a case study, see E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company: the Conoco split-oﬀ (A),
HBS 9-202-005.
5Equity Carveouts
An equity carveout is an initial public oﬀering (IPO) of a fraction of the
stock in a subsidiary. The subsidiary gets its own management team
and a separate board of directors. It becomes subject to all ﬁnancial
and other reporting requirements of public companies, such as 10-K
reports and proxy statements ﬁled with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).1
The parent company often retains a controlling interest, creating
a public minority interest in the subsidiary. There are several rea-
sons for the retention of a majority ownership of the voting rights:
retention of at least 80% allows consolidation for tax purposes and the
opportunity to subsequently undertake a tax free spinoﬀ, while reten-
tion of 50% or more permits consolidation for accounting purposes.
Allen and McConnell (1998) show that parent ﬁrms on average retains
69% (median 80%) of the subsidiary’s shares, while Vijh (2002) reports
a median parent ownership of 72%. Of course, since the subsidiary
becomes a publicly traded company of its own, the carveout does reduce
the parent’s control over its former wholly owned subsidiary.
1See Hand and Skantz (1998) for an analysis of the accounting choice for equity carveouts
under SAB 51. Allen (1998) describes the equity carveout strategy of Thermo Electron,
which carved out 11 subsidiaries during 1983–1995.
196
5.1 Transaction Volume 197
The shares oﬀered in the IPO may be sold either by the subsidiary
itself (a primary issue) or by the parent company (a secondary issue).
A primary issue has no tax consequence, while a secondary issue is
taxable to the parent as a capital gain. Because of this diﬀerence in
tax treatment, the majority of equity carveouts are primary issues. The
parent company may leave the proceeds from the IPO in the subsidiary
or require that they are paid out to the parent. To minimize taxes, the
proceeds are streamed back to the parent typically using the following
procedure: (i) prior to the carveout, the subsidiary issues a tax-free
dividend to the parent in the form of a note (debt obligation); (ii) after
the carveout, the proceeds from the IPO are used to repay the note.
5.1 Transaction Volume
Figure 5.1 shows the annual distribution of equity carveout announce-
ments worldwide from 1985 to 2012, using data from SDC. The carveout
volume peaked in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, both in numbers and dollar
values. The total market value of subsidiary IPOs reached $80 billion in
1993 and there was over 500 announced equity carveout transactions in
1994. The turn of the century saw a second surge in the dollar volume
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Fig. 5.1 Annual volume of equity carveouts worldwide, 1985–2012. Total transaction value
in $ billion and number of carveout announcements. (Source: SDC).
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of carveouts ($70 billion in 1999), however, without a corresponding
increase in the number of transactions. In recent years, only a handful
of equity carveout transactions have been announced each year.
Since the mid-1990s, most carveouts have taken place outside the
United States. The way SDC classiﬁes carveouts, this transaction cat-
egory also contains subsidiaries carved out by the government (state
privatizations). The largest equity carveout in 2012 was the listing of
the food processing company Ninh Hoa Sugar on the HCM City Stock
Exchange, Vietnam ($1.8 billion).
5.2 Valuation Eﬀects
Equity carveouts are viewed favorably by the market. Table 5.1
shows the parent cumulative abnormal announcement stock return
for 10 selected studies of equity carveouts over the period 1965–2007.
The average announcement return is positive and signiﬁcant across all
samples, ranging from 0.5% to 2.7%. The sample-size-weighted average
is 1.8% for the total of 1,251 cases. The lowest average announcement
Table 5.1. Cumulative abnormal returns for 1,251 equity carveout announcements in 10
selected studies, 1965–2007.
CAR is the parent cumulative abnormal stock return over the event window relative to the
announcement of the equity carveout. Relative size is the ratio of the market value of equity
of the carved out subsidiary and its parent company.
CAR Relative size
Sample Time Event
Study Mean Median Mean Median size period window
Schipper and Smith (1986) 1.8% 8% 76 1965–1983 [−4,0]
Klein et al. (1991) 2.7% 52 1966–1983 [−4,0]
Slovin et al. (1995) 1.2% 1.5% 45% 31% 32 1980–1991 [0,1]
Allen and McConnell
(1998)
2.1% 20% 14% 186 1978–1993 [−1,1]
Vijh (1999, 2002) 1.9% 18% 336 1980–1997 [−1,1]
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 2.3% 0.8% 37% 17% 125 1990–1999 [−1,1]
Hulburt (2003) 1.6% 1.1% 30% 172 1981–1994 [−1,0]
Wagner (2004) 1.7% 32% 22% 71 1984–2002 [−1,1]
Jain et al. (2011) 1.6% 65 1986–2005 [−1,1]
Sun and Shu (2011) 0.5% 136 1994–2007 [−1,1]
Sample-size weighted
average
1.8% 33% 1,251 1965–2007
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returns of 0.5% are found in a sample of 136 Taiwanese ﬁrms (Sun and
Shu, 2011). The announcement returns for a sample of 71 German ﬁrms
average 1.7%, which is similar to the returns for U.S. ﬁrms (Wagner,
2004). Interestingly, the positive returns found for equity carveouts are
in stark contrast to announcements of seasoned equity oﬀerings, upon
which the parent stock price typically falls.2
The average carved out subsidiary across the studies in Table 5.1
has a market value of about one-third of that of its parent. As for
other breakup transactions, the announcement returns are found to
be increasing in the relative size of the carved out subsidiary (Allen
and McConnell, 1998; Vijh, 2002). Vijh (1999) estimates long-term
(three-year) abnormal stock returns for both parent companies and the
carved out subsidiaries, and ﬁnds that these are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero using a variety of benchmarks. Thus, the value creation from
the carveout is captured in the parent stock price at the time of the
announcement.
5.3 Drivers of Value Creation in Equity Carveouts
Equity carveouts separate the subsidiary from its parent. After the
carveout, transactions between the two companies must take place at
arms length. As a result, many of the sources of value creation in
spinoﬀs may also create value in carveouts. In addition, the partial
control retained by the parent may allow for further sources of value
creation, including wealth transfers from new equity holders and infor-
mation about the subsidiary generated by the market.
5.3.1 Increased Focus
Vijh (2002) examines a sample of 336 equity carveouts between 1980
and 1997. A majority of the motives oﬀered for the carveout by the
parent company involve lack of ﬁt and focus, and a desire to restructure
the operations. He shows that parents and subsidiaries in carveouts
are typically in diﬀerent industries, and documents that announcement
returns on average are higher for carveouts of non-related subsidiaries.
2See Eckbo et al. (2007) for a review of security oﬀerings.
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The evidence on improvements in operating performance follow-
ing carveouts is mixed. Hulburt et al. (2002) ﬁnd that both parents
and subsidiaries improve their operating performance relative to their
industry peers in the year after the carveout. In contrast, Powers (2003)
and Boone et al. (2003) show that the subsidiary operating performance
declines after the carveout. Interestingly, Boone et al. (2003) further
ﬁnd that the operating performance of the parent company improves
only when it has completely divested its ownership in the subsidiary
after four years.
5.3.2 Financing Subsidiary Growth
Information asymmetries between the ﬁrm and outside investors tend
to increase the cost of capital (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Prior to
the carveout, outside investors have access to the parent company’s
ﬁnancial information, with information at the divisional level being less
accessible. This opaqueness may increase the cost of funding divisional-
level capital expenditures. Because a public listing of the subsidiary
increases the quality of the ﬁnancial information available to investors,
Schipper and Smith (1986) suggest that equity carveouts help ﬁnance
high-growth subsidiaries. Their data bears this out: in their sample, a
frequently stated motive for the carveout is to enable the subsidiary to
ﬁnance future growth. They also show that carved out subsidiaries typ-
ically have higher price-earnings ratios than their parents, indicating
higher-growth rates.3
Chen and Guo (2005) also report that parent ﬁrms prefer equity
carveouts and divestitures to spinoﬀs when revenue growth and book-
to-market ratios are high. Vijh (2002) further ﬁnds that, over a subse-
quent three-year period, both parents and their carved out subsidiaries
do a greater number of seasoned equity oﬀerings than control ﬁrms
matched by industry and size. In addition, the capital expenditures of
the subsidiaries exceed those of their control ﬁrms. Overall, it appears
that equity carveouts are used to increase ﬁnancing opportunities and
reduce ﬁnancing costs for high-growth subsidiaries.
3Bayar et al. (2011) present a model where equity carveouts are used to fund new projects
when outsiders are more optimistic than insiders about the project’s cash ﬂows.
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Michaely and Shaw (1995) document investment banking fees of
7% for carveouts and 2% for spinoﬀs in a sample of 61 carveouts and
30 spinoﬀs between 1981 and 1988. They attribute the higher costs of
carveouts to the greater scrutiny and more stringent disclosure stan-
dard associated with the continued control by the parent company.
They also suggest that, because of the higher costs, carveouts are more
attractive to ﬁrms with relatively low leverage that hold high-quality
assets. Consistent with this, they ﬁnd that larger less-leveraged parents
with relatively large and low-risk subsidiaries tend to prefer a carveout
to a spinoﬀ.
5.3.3 Wealth Transfers and Information Asymmetries
Carveouts have the potential for transferring wealth to shareholders
from other claimholders. For example, the separation of assets from
the parent possibly reduces the cash ﬂow and collateral available to
bondholders. Allen and McConnell (1998) ﬁnd, however, positive excess
bond returns when ﬁrms announce a carveout, thus rejecting the bond-
holder wealth transfer hypothesis.
Nanda (1991) models an equity carveout using the adverse selection
framework of Myers and Majluf (1984). In equilibrium, only under-
valued parents with overvalued subsidiaries perform carveouts. Thus,
carveouts cause a positive announcement eﬀect on average (and there
are no wealth transfers).4 Slovin et al. (1995) examine industry rivals of
equity carveout ﬁrms. They postulate that the market’s misvaluation
may apply to all ﬁrms in the industry. For a sample of 32 carveouts
between 1980 and 1991, they show that industry rivals of the carved
out subsidiaries experience negative announcement returns, consistent
with the overvaluation argument. They also report insigniﬁcant abnor-
mal returns to parent-company rivals. However, Hulburt et al. (2002)
ﬁnd negative returns for parent-company rivals as well, using a sam-
ple of 185 equity carveout announcements over 1981–1994. They argue
4By assuming the carveout’s assets in place are suﬃciently small relative to those of the
parent, Nanda (1991) rules out the possibility that the parent of the carveout is also over-
valued (which would result in a negative announcement eﬀect of the carveout). Overvalued
parents always prefer to issue their own shares.
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that this is evidence against the proposition the parents of carveouts
tend to be undervalued.
Vijh (2006) examines the announcement returns to the seasoned
equity oﬀering (SEO) of 90 subsidiaries and 37 parents following equity
carveouts. He documents negative returns to the issuer, but insigniﬁ-
cant returns to the non-issuer, whether parent or subsidiary. Using a
sample of equity carveouts from 1995–2002, Baltin and Brettel (2007)
detect traces of market timing for the 1998–2000 “hot-market” period.
Overall, the proposition that equity carveouts are designed to sell over-
valued equity in the subsidiary receives mixed support.
Several studies examine ﬁrst-day returns when the carved out sub-
sidiary is listed. Prezas et al. (2000) and Hogan and Olson (2004)
document lower initial returns in carveouts than in traditional initial
public oﬀerings. See also Benveniste et al. (2008) and Thompson (2010)
for evidence on underpricing in initial public oﬀerings of carved out
subsidiaries, and Lamont and Thaler (2003) for evidence on mispricing
between the subsidiary and parent company following tech stock
carveouts.
5.3.4 Follow-on Events
Equity carveouts appear to be a temporary organizational form.
A majority of equity carveouts are followed by a subsequent event.
In Schipper and Smith (1986), two-thirds of 76 carved out subsidiaries
were later reacquired by the parent (23), divested entirely (17), spun
oﬀ (4), or liquidated (4). Moreover, Klein et al. (1991) ﬁnd that 44 of
52 carveouts (85%) are followed by a second event: 25 reacquisitions,
17 selloﬀs, and two spinoﬀs. Divestitures take place sooner than reac-
quisitions: three-quarter of the divestitures occur within three years
of the carveout, compared to one-third of the reacquisitions. Also, the
likelihood of reacquisition is greater when the parent retains 80% or
more of the subsidiary shares. Desai et al. (2011) further show that the
reacquisition probability is higher when the parent and subsidiary are
linked through product-market agreements.
Klein et al. (1991) argue that an equity carveout may be the ﬁrst
stage in a divestiture of a subsidiary. As noted above, the listing of
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subsidiary’s shares reduces informational asymmetries and expose the
subsidiary to the market for corporate control. Perotti and Rossetto
(2007) model equity carveouts as a way for the parent to obtain infor-
mation from the market on the value of the subsidiary as an indepen-
dent entity. While costly, the listing generates information about the
optimal allocation of ownership of the subsidiary. Thus, the carveout
improves the decision to exercise the option to sell or reacquire control,
explaining the temporary nature of carveouts.
Gleason et al. (2006) document insigniﬁcant announcement returns
for carveouts that are later reacquired. However, Klein et al. (1991)
show that parents experience signiﬁcantly positive announcement
returns when the follow-on event is a selloﬀ, both at the initial equity
carveout and at the subsequent divestiture. Moreover, the probability
of becoming a target is higher for carved out subsidiaries than for a
sample of matched ﬁrms (Hulburt, 2003). Chahine and Goergen (2011)
argue that there is more pre-oﬀer publicity in equity carveouts that
are followed by a spinoﬀ in order to attract retail investors and pre-
vent the emergence of new blocks, which could reduce the value of the
subsidiary. Overall, the evidence is consistent with equity carveouts
creating value by facilitating future corporate control events.
5.4 Agency Issues
Allen and McConnell (1998) argue that some managers avoid selling
oﬀ assets because their compensation (both tangible and intangible) is
tied to the size of the assets that they manage. When the ﬁnancing of
investments requires an asset sale, management prefers to sell a minor-
ity stake in a subsidiary, maintaining assets under control. For a sample
of 188 equity carveouts, they ﬁnd that parent ﬁrms perform relatively
poorly prior to initiating a carveout: parents have lower interest cov-
erage ratios, higher leverage, lower operating proﬁtability, and lower
return on assets than their industry rivals. In sum, the sample parents
of the carveouts were poor performers and cash constrained.
Allen and McConnell (1998) also ﬁnd that the stock market’s reac-
tion to the carveout announcement is determined by the use of the
proceeds. Firms announcing that the proceeds will be reinvested in the
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ﬁrm experience insigniﬁcant announcement returns, while the average
CAR is a signiﬁcant 7% for ﬁrms that will use the proceeds for debt
repayment or a dividend. This suggests that the stock market may be
concerned with ineﬃcient investment decisions if the ﬁrm retains the
proceeds. Schipper and Smith (1986) provide further evidence on man-
agers’ reluctance to relinquish control of the subsidiary. They document
that, in a majority of cases, the President or CEO of the carved out
subsidiary is also a parent company manager.
Powers (2003) suggests that managers use their inside information
about the subsidiary’s prospects in determining what fraction of sub-
sidiary shares to sell to the public. He shows that the subsequent
improvement in subsidiary operating performance tends to increase
in the size of the ownership stake retained by the parent. Similarly,
Atanasov et al. (2005) show that carved out subsidiaries tend to have
lower operating performance than their peers only when parents retain
less than 50% ownership. Their interpretation is very diﬀerent, how-
ever. They suggest that parent managers self-select the carveout either
to avoid consolidating the subsidiary’s ﬁnancial results, or to transfer
wealth from the minority shareholders in non-consolidated subsidiaries
through intercorporate transactions ex post.
6Tracking Stocks
Tracking stock — also called targeted stock or letter stock — is a
separate class of parent company common stock whose dividends track
the performance of a given division. That is, the holders of the tracking
stock are entitled to the cash ﬂow generated by this division, hence
determining the value of the stock. The diversiﬁed company retains
its legal form as one consolidated entity, however, with one and the
same board of directors and top management team. There is no legal
separation or transfer of assets, and the parent retains control of the
division. As a result, the voting rights of the tracking stock are in the
parent ﬁrm and not in the tracked division. These voting rights typically
vary in proportion to the market value of the underlying division, but
could also be ﬁxed at the issue of the tracking stock.
There are several ways to distribute tracking stock. It can be issued
to current shareholders as a dividend or used as payment in an acquisi-
tion. The most common way is, however, to sell the tracking stock in a
public oﬀering, raising cash for the parent ﬁrm. Once the tracking stock
is listed, the underlying division ﬁles separate ﬁnancial statements with
the SEC. Thus, tracking stock creates a type of quasi-pure play, where
the tracked division ﬁles its own ﬁnancial statements and has its own
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stock, while still being part of the diversiﬁed ﬁrm. Since tracking stock
is an issue of the company’s own stock, it has no tax implications.
6.1 Transaction Volume
The ﬁrst tracking stock was issued by General Motors (GM) in 1984 as
part of the payment for Electronic Data Systems (EDS). The new stock,
GM-E, allowed the selling shareholders — most notably Ross Perot,
who continued in a management position — to participate in the upside
of EDS, despite being part of a much larger company going forward.
GM issued its second class of tracking stock, GM-H, in 1985 when
acquiring Hughes Aircraft. The next company to issue tracking stock
was USX, separating its steel division from its oil division (Marathon)
in 1991.
In total, 32 U.S. companies have issued some 50 diﬀerent tracking
stocks to date, most of them in the 1990s. The market seems to have lost
its appetite for tracking stock since the turn of the century. The most
recent issues of tracking stock include Sprint PCS and CarMax Group
in 2001, and AT&T Wireless and Disney’s Go.Com in 2000. Carolina
Group announced an issue in 2002 that was subsequently withdrawn.
Internationally, there has been only a handful tracking stock issues,
including Sony Communication Network in 2001 (Japan) and Alcatel
Optronics (France) in 2000.
6.2 Valuation Eﬀects
Announcements of tracking stock are received positively by the mar-
ket. D’Souza and Jacob (2000) document an average abnormal two-
day announcement return of 3.7% for 37 tracking stocks issued by
14 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1999. Billett and Mauer (2000),
Elder and Westra (2000), Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001), and Harper
and Madura (2002) also report positive tracking stock announcement
ACARs of 2–3%. Notice, however, that, given the limited number of
tracking stock issues, these studies use largely the same data.
The evidence on the long-run performance of tracking stock is
inconclusive. Examining 19 ﬁrms issuing tracking stock, Chemmanur
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and Paeglis (2001) ﬁnd that the stock of parent ﬁrms underperforms
industry indexes over a subsequent three-year period, while the aver-
age subsidiary outperforms its industry index. In contrast, Billett and
Vijh (2004) document negative buy-and-hold returns for subsidiaries,
but insigniﬁcant long-term excess returns for parents. Clayton and Qian
(2004) further report insigniﬁcant long-run stock performance for track-
ing stock issuers. As discussed below, however, the strongest testament
to a poor performance of tracking stock is the fact that they have
almost entirely disappeared from the marketplace.
6.3 Drivers of Value Creation in Tracking Stock
A tracking stock is akin to a “quasi-pure play.” On the one hand,
tracking stock allows the ﬁrm to retain its internal capital market, ﬁle
a joint tax return, and share certain ﬁxed costs and resources (Billett
and Mauer, 2000; Danielova, 2008). On the other hand, the require-
ment to ﬁle separate ﬁnancial statements with the SEC provides some
degree of separation between a division and its parent. Also, the track-
ing stock makes it possible to give stock-based compensation to sub-
sidiary managers.
Clayton and Qian (2004) examine whether the separate listings
increase the demand for the parent and subsidiary stocks. They docu-
ment an ex-date abnormal return of 3% for the parent company, sug-
gesting that the quasi-pure play created by the tracking stock increases
investor interest in the ﬁrm. However, Elder et al. (2005) fail to ﬁnd
any increase in the liquidity of the parent ﬁrm after the tracking stock
issue. Instead, ﬁrms issuing tracking stock have relatively low stock-
market liquidity and greater bid–ask spreads than comparable control
ﬁrms. Overall, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether tracking stock
increases investor demand to hold the diversiﬁed ﬁrm.
Logue et al. (1996) argue that tracking stock is most useful for ﬁrms
where the beneﬁts of consolidation and integration outweigh the ben-
eﬁts from a complete separation. However, it is questionable whether
tracking stock separates the divisions suﬃciently to successfully create
a pure play stock. Not surprisingly, D’Souza and Jacob (2000) show
that the returns of tracking stocks are more highly correlated with
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other common stocks of the same company than with other ﬁrms in
the same four-digit SIC industry as the tracked division. We now turn
to a discussion of the major failure of tracking stock.
6.4 Agency Issues
Under U.S. corporate law, the board of directors has full discretion to
transfer assets between wholly owned divisions (within any limits set by
debt covenants). The assets underlying a tracking stock therefore lack
legal protection from expropriation by the parent company.1 Toward
the end of the 1990s, ﬁrms issuing tracking stock started to explicitly
warn investors of the risk of expropriation. For example, in its 1999
prospectus for tracking stock in its online broker, Donaldson, Lufkin, &
Jenrette (DLJ) warned of a conﬂict of interest: “The board of directors
may make decisions that favor DLJ at the expense of DLJdirect.”
There are several examples of expropriation taking place. When
GM in August 1995 announced its plan to spin oﬀ its tracking stock
in EDS (GM-E), it ﬁrst required EDS to make a one-time contribution
of $500 million to the parent (GM). EDS shareholders challenged this
payment in Delaware court — and lost: the court’s decision was that
the board of directors has full discretion to transfer money within the
corporation — tracking stock or not. Similarly, before U.S. Steel spun
oﬀ the tracking stock in its oil division Marathon in 2001, it ﬁrst trans-
ferred $900 million of debt to Marathon. Not surprisingly, the stock of
the steel division soared 19% on the day of this announcement.
The poor legal protection of the assets underlying a tracking stock
is likely the major reason for the near-disappearance of this security.
In fact, most of the tracking stocks have been reversed over the last
decade. In a press release issued on December 16, 1999, Kerry Hoggard,
chairman of Fletcher Challenge Ltd., said: “It is clear the the Group’s
capital structure is seen as complex by investors, is perceived to raise
governance issues, and has resulted in a signiﬁcant structural discount
being applied to all our stocks. We cannot allow this to continue, and
1Hass (1996) provides an in-depth discussion of the ﬁduciary duties of the company’s direc-
tors as they relate to tracking stock.
6.4 Agency Issues 209
will move as quickly as possible to a full dismantling of the target share
structure.”
Billett and Vijh (2004) examine 11 announcements to remove the
tracking stock structure. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant and positive excess stock
returns of 14% to the dismantling announcement. Tracking stock in its
current form may very well be a phenomenon of the past.
7Leveraged Recapitalizations
A leveraged recapitalization (a “recap”) is a signiﬁcant payout to share-
holders ﬁnanced by new debt borrowed against the ﬁrm’s future cash
ﬂow. The company remains publicly traded, but with a substantially
higher debt level. For a sample of 27 ﬁrms completing leveraged recaps
over the period 1984–1988, Gupta and Rosenthal (1991) ﬁnd a threefold
increase in the average debt-to-total-capital ratio, from 22% of to 67%.
Denis and Denis (1993) document that the median ratio of total debt
to total assets increases from 45% to 86% for a sample of 39 recaps
in 1984–1988. Moreover, studying 42 leveraged recaps between 1985
and 1989, Handa and Radhakrishnan (1991) report that the proposed
payout averages 60% of the pre-recap market value of equity.
The cash distribution to shareholders is typically structured as a
large, special, one-time dividend. Alternatively, the distribution could
be in the form of a share repurchase or exchange oﬀer. Management
often forfeits the cash distribution on their shareholdings and instead
takes additional stock. Consequently, leveraged recaps typically result
in a substantial increase in managerial equity ownership. Handa
and Radhakrishnan (1991) document that insider equity ownership
increases by three times, while Gupta and Rosenthal (1991) report a
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doubling of the insider ownership (from 3.8% to 8.4%). In Denis and
Denis (1993), the median ownership of oﬃcers, directors, and employees
soars from 6% to 15%.
Prior to the widespread use of poison pills, leveraged recaps were
sometimes used as a defense against a hostile takeover threat. See
Denis (1990) for an analysis of leveraged recapitalizations as a takeover
defense.
A leveraged recapitalization triggers a tax liability at the investor
level. The tax depends on how the payout to shareholders is struc-
tured. For a special dividend, the amount distributed from the ﬁrm’s
retained earnings is taxed as a dividend. If the special dividend exceeds
the retained earnings on the ﬁrm’s balance sheet, the remaining cash
distribution is a return of capital, treated as a capital gain. If the recap
is structured as a share repurchase, the entire distribution is taxed as
a capital gain.
The ﬁnancial accounting for leveraged recapitalizations does not
require any step-up of the company’s assets. As a result, if the new debt
exceeds the book value of the ﬁrm’s equity, the company’s book equity
becomes negative following the recap. What appears like a leveraged
buyout by a private equity sponsor is sometimes structured as a recap.
Recap accounting can be used if the buyer acquires less than 94.9% of
the ﬁrm’s stock, and the owners of the minority interest, which must
be widely held, are independent from the buyer.
7.1 Transaction Volume
There was a substantial number of large leveraged recapitalizations
in the late 1980s, apparently capitalizing on relatively easy access to
high-yield ﬁnancing (Denis and Denis, 1995).1 Several of these recap-
italizations were made in response to a takeover threat. For example,
following a hostile takeover oﬀer from Limited, Carter Hawley Hale
announced plans to make a special payout of $325 million. The payout,
which was completed in September 1987, increased the ﬁrms total debt
1We do not have access to public data sources systematically identifying leveraged recap-
italizations. SDC ﬂags “recapitalization”, however, this ﬂag does not uniquely identify
leveraged recapitalization which is the focus here.
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to 114% of the book value of the ﬁrms assets. In response to a hostile
takeover attempt by the Rales brothers in the fall of 1988, Interco
made a special payout of $2.4 billion in cash and securities, increasing
total debt to 157% of the book value of total assets. Other ﬁrms mak-
ing large debt-increasing dividend payments in 1986–1989 include arms
producer Colt Industries, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, retail food chain
Kroger, building product maker Owens Corning, packaging company
Sealed Air, and gypsum board manufacturer USG.
The economic recession in 1990–1991, combined with regulatory
restrictions on investments in high-yield instruments, and a reduction
in new lending by commercial banks, ended the wave of highly leveraged
transactions in the United States. Also, the large recaps seen in the
1980s did not return following the revival of the debt markets in the
early 2000s.
7.2 Valuation Eﬀects
The wealth eﬀects of leveraged recapitalizations are substantial. For a
sample of 44 recaps over 1985–1990, Bae and Simet (1998) ﬁnd a two-
day shareholder ACAR of 5.7%. Moreover, Handa and Radhakrishnan
(1991) report an average two-day abnormal return of 5.5%, and Gupta
and Rosenthal (1991) ﬁnd an average announcement CAR of 5.9%.
Moreover, Balachandran et al. (2004) document a three-day average
CAR of 4.4% for a sample of 167 leveraged recapitalizations in Australia
between 1989 and 2002.
Since the leveraged recapitalization may be a response to a corpo-
rate control threat, several studies measure the returns over a longer
event window. Denis and Denis (1993) use a window starting 40 days
prior to initiation, deﬁned as the ﬁrst indication of a takeover or the
announcement of the recap, through completion of the recap. They esti-
mate an average abnormal return of 32% (median 26%). Kaplan and
Stein (1990) compute the cumulative abnormal stock return starting
40 days prior to the recap announcement, or the day of a hostile bid if
there is one, through the recap completion. They ﬁnd an average CAR
of 45% (median 47%) for 12 leveraged recapitalizations between 1985
and 1988.
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Kaplan and Stein (1990) further estimate the change in systematic
risk of the ﬁrm’s securities after the leveraged recap. The increase in the
equity risk is relatively modest. Using daily returns and market-model
estimates, the average equity beta increases by 37% from 1.01 to 1.38
after the recapitalization. They then make two diﬀerent assumptions
about the change in total asset risk from the transaction. Assuming that
the systematic risk of the assets (asset beta) is constant, the implied
debt beta averages 0.65. However, when they assume that the entire
market-adjusted premium represents a reduction in ﬁxed costs, the
implied debt beta averages 0.40. Overall, leveraged recapitalizations
generate substantial shareholder wealth and appears to be associated
with a surprisingly small increase in equity systematic risk.
7.3 Drivers of Value Creation in Leveraged
Recapitalizations
As discussed earlier, the high debt in leveraged recapitalizations reduces
the ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow and hence managerial discretion over the
investment decisions (Jensen, 1986). Denis and Denis (1993) exam-
ine the change in operating performance and investments for 29 com-
pleted recapitalizations between 1984 and 1988. They document large
decreases in the undistributed cash ﬂow (median −31%) and capi-
tal expenditures (median −35%), despite improvements in operating
performance (median 21%) from the year prior to the year after the
recap. Also, the post-recap cash ﬂow covers only two-thirds of the
pre-recap capital expenditures, forcing a reduction in the level of invest-
ments. They further examine the market reaction for capital expendi-
ture announcements and ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative ACAR over the
ﬁve-year period prior to the recapitalization, suggesting a past pat-
tern of overinvestment. Following the recap, the average number of
announced investments drops from 1.2 to 0.3 per ﬁrm and year, with
an average stock market reaction that is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. They conclude that the increased debt plays a central role in
disciplining managers’ investment decisions.
Consistent with these results, Wruck (1994) documents organiza-
tional and compensation changes in Sealed Air following its leveraged
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recapitalization in 1989. She suggests that the ﬁnancial leverage was
used as a tool to improve the internal control systems, which together
with the high debt service created an environment that led to enormous
performance improvements and value creation.
Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) study the eﬃciency of the internal
allocation of investments after leveraged recapitalizations in 22 multi-
divisional ﬁrms between 1982 and 1994. Prior to the recap, companies
allocate investments to high q divisions. Following the recap, however,
investments become less sensitive to division q and more sensitive to
division cash ﬂow. While this may indicate that the internal alloca-
tion of capital becomes less eﬃcient, the total level of capital expen-
diture declines, as does the ﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation discount. Peyer and
Shivdasani (2001) conclude that the costs of distorted divisional invest-
ments are outweighed by the beneﬁts of lower ﬁrm-level investments.
Overall, leveraged recapitalizations appear to create value by curbing
managerial overinvestment and improving operating performance.
Walker (1998) suggests that the beneﬁts from leveraged recapital-
izations are transitory, examining 39 recaps between 1985 and 1989.
He ﬁnds that the recap ﬁrms have higher free cash ﬂow prior to the
recap than matching ﬁrms. However, the pre-recap level of capital
expenditures is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of its peers. More-
over, operating performance increases from year −1 to +1 relative to
the special dividend but reverts in the subsequent years.
A leveraged recapitalization could be used to signal management’s
private information about the future cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm. Healy
and Palepu (1995) describe how managers at CUC International
successfully undertook a leveraged recap in 1989 to communicate their
optimistic beliefs about the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows to investors. Bal-
achandran et al. (2004) examine if the positive information conveyed by
a recap extends to other ﬁrms in the industry. They ﬁnd insigniﬁcant
stock returns for competitors of ﬁrms announcing a leveraged recapi-
talization, suggesting that the content of any new information is unique
to the recap ﬁrm.
A large fraction of the leveraged recapitalizations in the late 1980s
subsequently failed. Denis and Denis (1995) report that nine (one-third)
of 27 ﬁrms completing a leveraged recap between 1985 and 1988 became
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ﬁnancially distressed. They ﬁnd that the poor operating performance
of the nine distressed ﬁrms is in line with that of their industry peers.
Moreover, the stock market reacts negatively to announcements of asset
sales, as well as to economic and regulatory events associated with the
demise of the high-yield market. They conclude that the incidence of
distress is not related to poorly structured transactions, but rather to
unexpected macroeconomic and regulatory developments.
8Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)
A leveraged buyout is the acquisition of an entire company or a divi-
sion, ﬁnanced largely with debt. The buyer is typically a private equity
fund — or in large deals sometimes a consortium of funds — managed
by an LBO sponsor. The target ﬁrm thus becomes a private company
after the takeover. The sponsor raises debt to ﬁnance the majority of
the purchase price and makes an equity investment from the fund. The
equity is injected into a shell company, which simultaneously borrows
the debt and acquires the target. Management is often required to con-
tribute with a fraction of the equity investment.
The sponsor relies on the cash ﬂow generated by the target com-
pany to service the debt, which is paid oﬀ as fast as possible. Sometimes
asset sales are used to help amortize the debt. The sponsor monitors
ﬁrm performance closely, focusing on cash ﬂow and return on invest-
ment measures. The objective is to improve the portfolio company’s
operating eﬃciency and grow its revenues for a three-to-ﬁve year period
before divesting the ﬁrm. LBO sponsors try to time the market and exit
the investment when market conditions are favorable. The exit may
be through an IPO, a sale to a strategic buyer, or a sale to another
LBO fund. While an IPO typically generates a higher valuation, the
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drawback is that it usually takes several years for the LBO fund to
entirely unwind its holdings through the public markets.
Because of the heavy debt load, a target ﬁrm is traditionally char-
acterized by a strong predictable cash ﬂow, supported by a history
of proﬁtability. In addition, it is often in a mature industry, with low
growth and limited need for additional capital expenditures. The indus-
try scope of leveraged buyouts has increased over time, however, as
has the importance of international deals. Also, while the conventional
LBO involves a publicly traded target company, a majority of leveraged
buyout transactions involve a privately held target ﬁrm.
A management buyout (MBO) is a leveraged buyout of a segment,
a division or a subsidiary of a large corporation and in which key cor-
porate executives play a critical role. MBOs are generally smaller than
traditional LBOs and, depending on the size of the transaction, a spon-
sor need not be involved. In the following, MBOs are singled out only
if this term is explicitly used to characterize a sample.
8.1 Transaction Volume
The leverage buyout activity varies considerably over time. Figure 8.1
shows the total deal value and number of LBOs announced globally
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between 1985 and 2012, using data from SDC. A ﬁrst surge in the
LBO activity occurred in the late 1980s and took place primarily in the
United States. This is when landmark transactions such as KKR’s buy-
outs of RJR Nabisco (worth $25 billion) and Safeway ($4 billion) took
place. This ﬁrst wave of highly leveraged public buyouts in the United
States ended abruptly with the economic recession in 1990–1991, com-
bined with the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert, regulatory
restrictions on high-yield investments, and reduced lending by com-
mercial banks.
The number of non-U.S. buyouts grew steadily through the 1990s,
when most of the transactions involved private companies and divi-
sions. As large amounts of debt ﬁnancing became easily available in
the mid-2000s, the public-to-private transaction reappeared in a second
buyout boom. The total value of LBO transactions announced world-
wide exceeded $700 billion in both 2006 and 2007. Indeed, in 2006, 19%
of the total M&A volume globally came from LBO activity, compared
to an annual average of 8% over the period 2001–2012.
Large U.S. buyouts during this second wave include the acquisi-
tions of Equity Oﬃce Properties ($41 billion), hospital chain HCA
($33 billion), Texas energy giant TXU ($32 billion), the world’s largest
casino company Harrah’s Entertainment ($28 billion), media com-
pany Clear Channel Communications ($27 billion), payment processor
First Data ($26 billion), student-loan provider SLM ($26 billion),
pipeline operator Kinder Morgan ($22 billion) and Hilton Hotels
($20 billion), to mention a few. Large buyouts announced outside the
United States in 2006–2007 include Canadian telephone company BCE
($51 billion), British pharmacy-led health and beauty group Alliance
Boots ($22 billion), U.K. airport operator BAA ($22 billion), Span-
ish cigarette producer Altadis ($18 billion), U.K. utility group Thames
Water ($15 billion), and Japanese mobile phone company Vodafone KK
($14 billion).
With the bankruptcies of Freddie Mac and Fannie May in 2007,
debt ﬁnancing for large transactions dried up and put a stop to the
mega deals. Over the next couple of years, only a limited number of
large, brand name buyouts were undertaken. After relatively low deal
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volumes in 2008 and 2009, however, the LBO transaction volume has
recovered.
In 2012, a total of 1,729 deals worth $151 billion were announced,
reﬂecting a relatively small deal size: the average size of deals
announced in 2012 was $87 million compared to an average annual
deal size of $130 million over the period 1980–2012. The largest
U.S. LBOs announced in 2012 include the Houston pipeline company
EP Energy ($7.1 billion), a management-led buyout of the cable
operator Cequel Communications ($6.6 billion), and Carlyle Group’s
acquisition of DuPont’s car paint unit ($4.9 billion). The largest non-
U.S. LBO deals in 2012 include U.K. housing group Annington Homes
($5.1 billion), Shanghai-based advertising company Focus Media Hold-
ing ($3.6 billion), and Swedish tool maker Ahlsell ($2.4 billion).
2013 has started strong with a higher LBO volume in the ﬁrst four
months than that in 2012. With the announcement of leveraged buyouts
of computer technology giant Dell ($24.4 billion) and ketchup maker
H.J. Heinz ($23.5 billion), it appears that the mega deals may be on
their way back.
Stromberg (2008) estimates the value of ﬁrms acquired in leveraged
buyouts between 1970 and 2007 to be a total of $3.6 trillion, three-
quarters of which represents LBOs undertaken after year 2000. This
second wave of large LBOs has spurred a renewed interest in leveraged
buyouts in empirical ﬁnancial research — much of which is surveyed
below.
8.2 The LBO Capital Structure
An LBO is ﬁnanced with a mix of bank loans, high-yield debt, mez-
zanine debt, and private equity. The pieces diﬀer in many ways: the
sources of capital; the ranking in the capital structure; the structure
of the coupon or dividend; callability and prepayment; maturity and
amortization; fees to underwriters; covenants and legal restrictions;
and marketing and the capital raising process. In the following, we
describe the main features of the diﬀerent pieces in the LBO ﬁrm’s
capital structure.
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8.2.1 The LBO Debt
The bank debt, referred to as leveraged loans, is secured and most senior
in the capital structure. The proportion leveraged loans in the LBO
ﬁrm’s capital structure varies, but was around 40% for U.S. buyouts
closed in 2006–2007, and closer to 45% in more recent transactions.
Leveraged loans are sold via a syndication memorandum (the “bank
book”) and are committed at the time of the transaction. Underwriter
fees range from 1.5% to 2.5%. While the maturity varies with the ﬁrm’s
credit proﬁle, it is commonly ﬁve to eight years and always shorter
than that of junior debt. The bank debt has to be amortized before
any other claimholders are paid oﬀ. A unique feature of the bank debt
is that it can be prepaid at par at any time without a penalty. Loan
covenants require the ﬁrm to maintain certain ﬁnancial ratios, and often
include cash sweeps, requiring the ﬁrm to use any excess cash ﬂow for
accelerated amortization of the bank loans.1
Panel A of Figure 8.2 shows the annual volume of U.S. sponsored
leveraged loans from 1997 to 2012, using data from Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) LCD. The leveraged loan issuance volume took oﬀ with the
second buyout wave and peaked in 2007 at $565 billion. The halt in
LBO activity through the ﬁnancial crises led to a record low leveraged
loan issuance volume of only $38 billion in 2009. The leveraged loan
market has since recovered, with a U.S. sponsored issuance volume of
$285 billion in 2012.
Panel B of Figure 8.2 shows the annual leveraged loans issuance
volume for the United States and Europe in 2006–2012. European cor-
porations have traditionally relied more on bank ﬁnancing than their
U.S. peers. While the leveraged loans issuance volume in Europe was
roughly half of that in the U.S. in the 2006–2009 period, it has failed to
keep up with the growth in the U.S. issuance volume starting in 2010.
As a result, in 2012, the leveraged loans issuance volume in Europe
was a mere $37 billion, compared to the $285 billion of leveraged loans
issued in the United States. In fact, the U.S. total issuance volume of
leveraged loans is approaching that of high-yield debt, discussed below.
1During the lax credit markets in 2006–2007, many lenders waived the cash sweep require-
ment.
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Fig. 8.2 Leveraged bank loans issuance volume. (Source: S&P’s LCD).
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The bank debt is typically structured into several tranches of term
loans (A, B, C, and D), where the holders of Tranche A also pro-rata
provides a revolving credit facility. Term-loan A (the pro-rata tranche)
is sold to commercial banks, is senior to the other tranches, and has a
maturity of ﬁve to six years. Tranches B, C, and D (the institutional
tranches) have minimal front-end amortization and somewhat longer
maturity (six to eight years). The institutional tranches are sold to
collateralized loan obligations (CLO), loan participation mutual funds,
hedge funds, high-yield bond funds, pensions funds, insurance compa-
nies, and other proprietary investors. CLOs are special-purpose vehi-
cles that pool a large number of leveraged loans, ﬁnanced with several
tranches of debt sold to institutional investors.
The leveraged loans are usually rated BB to B+ at issue. The inter-
est rate is ﬂoating, quoted as a spread above the London Interbank
Oﬀering Rate (LIBOR). The spread varies depending on the credit mar-
ket conditions, seniority, and ﬁrm characteristics.2 Figure 8.3 shows the
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Fig. 8.3 U.S. leveraged loans new-issue spreads, 4Q 1998–2Q 2012.
Average new-issue BB/BB-spreads above LIBOR for pro-rata and institutional tranches.
(Source: S&P’s LCD).
2As discussed below, there is also evidence that portfolio companies of brand name sponsors
get lower spreads.
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quarterly spread above LIBOR for new-issue BB/BB- leveraged loans
between the fourth quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2012
(source: S&P’s LCD). As shown in the graph, interest spreads were
around 160 basis points in 2005–2007 and higher when credit market
conditions are less favorable. While the institutional tranches have a
slightly higher spread than the pro-rata tranche, the spread diﬀerence
generally decreases when credit spreads are low.
The remaining debt is raised from the subordinated debt markets.
High-yield debt is subordinated to the bank debt and mostly unsecured.
Interest is ﬁxed, based on a spread to treasury bonds that varies with
credit quality, and expressed as a coupon. At issue, the high-yield debt
is rated below investment grade, ranging from B+ to CCC+. This debt
has a bullet maturity in 10 years, and is as a rule callable at a premium
after a non-callable ﬁve-year period (“10NC5”).
In the United States, the high-yield debt is often sold to a select
group of investors in a 144A oﬀering. Rule 144A of the U.S. Securi-
ties Act of 1933 provides a safe harbor from the registration require-
ments when the issue is oﬀered to qualiﬁed institutional investors (QIB)
that own at least $100 million in investable assets. High-yield investors
demand liquidity in an issue, which has typically meant a minimum of
issuance size $150–200 million. Fees to underwriters are higher than for
bank debt, and are in the range of 2.0%–3.5% of the amount issued.
Selling high-yield bonds requires a road show and hence a bond issue
takes time to close. It is therefore common practice to ﬁnance the high-
yield portion through a bridge loan at deal closing, repaid within a year
with the proceeds from the subsequent bond issue.
Panel A of Figure 8.4 shows the annual volume of high-yield debt
issuance in the United States from 1995 to 2012 (source: S&P’s LCD).
Interestingly, the high-yield debt markets recovered quickly after the
ﬁnancial crises and reached in 2012 a record high issuance volume of
$346 billion. Panel B shows the time series of the issuance volume of
high-yield debt for the United States and Europe in 2006–2012. The rel-
ative importance of high-yield debt ﬁnancing is much smaller in Europe
than in the United States. Over the 2006–2012 period, the European
high-yield debt issuance volume was roughly 20% of that in the United
States.
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(Source: S&P’s LCD).
As an alternative to high-yield debt, which is publicly traded, the
market for second lien loans took oﬀ in 2003. These loans are pri-
vately placed with hedge funds and CLO investors, and are secured
in the ﬁrm’s assets but subordinated to the bank loans. In 2007, the
total volume of second lien loans issued in the United States reached
$30 billion (source: S&P’s LCD). As shown in Figure 8.5, the second
lien loan market almost disappeared when the debt markets shut down
in 2007, and has since remained a niche market. In 2012, the U.S.
issue volume of second lien loans was a mere $6.8 billion. Second lien
loans are typically callable immediately, often for a small premium of
1%–3%.
Figure 8.6 shows annual average debt multiples, deﬁned as the pro
forma ratio of total debt to adjusted EBITDA, in LBO transactions
between 1997 and the second quarter of 2012 (source: S&P’s LCD).
Debt multiples were at a historical low in 2001 after the burst of the
internet bubble, with the average LBO ﬁrm raising debt of 3.5 times
EBITDA. The expansion of the debt markets and aggressive lending
practices over the following ﬁve-year period resulted in an average debt
multiple of 6.1 times EBITDA in 2007. After the ﬁnancing market
turmoil in mid-2007, however, debt multiples fell to a low of 3.7 in
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Fig. 8.6 Average pro-forma debt multiples (total debt to adjusted EBITDA) in LBOs,
1997-2Q 2012. (Source: S&P’s LCD).
2009. Since 2010, lending has again eased up, and the average debt
multiple was 5.3 times EBITDA in the ﬁrst six months of 2012.
In periods when the access to high-yield debt and leveraged loans
are limited, sponsors resort to mezzanine ﬁnancing. The mezzanine debt
replaces or is subordinated to the high-yield bonds, with tranches that
are often too small for a high-yield issue (i.e., below $150 million). It is
sold in a private placement, thus avoiding public ﬁling requirements and
roadshow. U.S. mezzanine investors are typically insurance companies
and mezzanine funds.
The mezzanine debt is a committed ﬁnancing with individually
negotiated terms. It is structured as a debt contract or preferred equity,
with warrants and other “equity kickers” attached to increase its total
returns. All or part of the interest expense or dividend is often in
the form of additional securities rather than cash, so-called pay-in-
kind (PIK).
Figure 8.7 shows the annual issuance of leveraged loans, high-yield
debt, and mezzanine debt in Europe, 2006–2012 (source: European
Mezzanine Review and S&P’s LCD). Banks have historically played
a much more important corporate funding role in Europe than in the
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Fig. 8.7 European issuance of mezzanine debt, high-yield debt, and leveraged loans in EUR
billion, 2006–2012. (Sources: European Mezzanine Review and S&P’s LCD).
United States, where the public capital markets provide three-quarters
of all corporate debt. A European bank would typically underwrite and
syndicate both a senior secured loan and the subordinated mezzanine
tranche, secured with a second lien.
However, as shown in the ﬁgure, banks in Europe have been pulling
back on extending credit. Leveraged loans issuance has fallen from a
peak of EUR 166 billion in 2007 to EUR 29 billion in 2012, and the role
of banks in underwriting and syndicating mezzanine tranches has been
negligible since 2009. This drop has been in part oﬀset by an increase
in European high-yield debt issuance over the last decade. Overall,
European below-investment grade debt markets are starting to look
more like those in the United States — relying more on capital markets
debt issuance (high-yield bonds) and less on bank lending (leveraged
loans and mezzanine ﬁnancing).
8.2.2 The LBO Equity and Sponsor Compensation
The private equity is the most junior in the capital structure. It typ-
ically has voting rights, but no dividends. This equity is raised in the
“alternative investments” market from pension funds, endowments,
228 Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)
44
92
142 163
251
181
138
106
216
360
547
664 679
312
285 306
252
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2Q-2012
$ billion
Fig. 8.8 Capital raised for private equity.
Total capital in $ billion raised globally in private equity funds with ﬁnal close 1997–2Q
2012. (Source: Preqin).
insurance companies, wealthy individuals, investment banks, and
“fund-of-funds” into a fund managed by a private equity partnership
(the sponsor). These alternative investments represent between 3% and
10% of the investors’ total portfolio holdings. The capital is raised into
a private equity fund managed by an LBO sponsor. Prominent LBO
sponsors include Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR. Figure 8.8 shows the
capital raised globally for private equity from 1997 to second quarter
of 2012 (source: Preqin).
Capital raised for private equity funds with ﬁnal close peaked in
2007 and 2008 with $664 billion and $679 billion, respectively. As shown
in the graph, the fund raising environment for private equity was more
diﬃcult in the years following the ﬁnancial crises. In the ﬁrst half of
2012, however, private equity funds raised a total of $252 billion, close
to the $306 billion raised in 2013. The equity is committed, but not paid
in until called by the LBO sponsor, typically with two weeks notice.
Most sponsors are paid a management fee of 2% on the fund’s
capital and receive a carried interest of 20% of the proﬁts above a
certain benchmark realized by the fund. In addition, many sponsors
charge transaction fees and annual monitoring fees to their portfolio
companies. For a sample of 6,000 investments made by buyout funds in
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1971–2007 in 30 countries, Phalippou (2009) estimates that the average
fund charges fees of 7% per year. He suggests that investors underesti-
mate the impact of fees because the fee contracts are opaque. See Met-
rick and Yasuda (2010) and Choi et al. (2011) for a detailed description
and analysis of the fee structure in LBO funds.
Current fund performance may also have implications for the ability
of the general partners to raise buyout capital in the future. Chung
et al. (2010) present a model which introduces implicit incentives from
future fundraising. For a typical ﬁrst-time fund, they estimate the size
of such implicit incentives to be of equal magnitude as the carried
interest in the current fund. Accounting for the incentive to fundraise
makes the performance-sensitive component of general partner revenue
much larger.
Robinson and Sensoy (2011b) investigate the determinants of fund
managers’ compensation in a mixed sample of 837 buyout and venture
capital funds in 1984–2010. The median management fee is 2%, a carry
of 20% is the norm, and the median general partner is required to coin-
vest 1% of the fund’s size, corresponding to a $3.6 billion investment
in the typical buyout fund. Controlling for fund size, management fees
tend to increase during fundraising booms. Management fees are gener-
ally lower in larger funds, while carried interest is higher. Importantly,
there is no evidence of a lower net-of-fee performance for higher-fee
funds or funds with a relatively low sponsor coinvestment. In other
words, sponsor compensation is largely unrelated to the net cash ﬂow
performance. The authors suggest that their evidence is consistent with
more skilled general partners earning higher compensation by generat-
ing higher gross performance.
Figure 8.9 shows the average equity contribution in LBOs from 1987
through second quarter of 2012 (source: Portfolio Management Data).
The deals at the end of the 1980s were extremely highly leveraged,
with an average equity portion of 8–10% of the total capital. Since
then, there has been a steadily increasing requirement for equity par-
ticipation in the buyout transactions. Over the last decade, most LBO
transactions have had a substantially higher fraction of equity ﬁnanc-
ing, with equity constituting on average between 40% and 50% of the
capital structure in recent years.
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Fig. 8.9 Average equity contribution in percent of the total capital in LBOs 1987–2Q 2012.
(Source: Portfolio Management Data).
Managers are generally required to co-invest in the buyout equity
along with the LBO fund. If a manager has been involved in a prior
buyout, she is asked to roll over a portion of her equity in the target
ﬁrm. If it is a ﬁrst-time LBO, managers may be oﬀered to buy equity
at a discount, or receive additional stock and options conditional on
certain performance goals.
8.2.3 Price Multiples and LBO Debt Levels
Price and debt levels in LBOs vary substantially across times. Fig-
ure 8.10 shows the average price multiple in LBOs, deﬁned as the ratio
of the purchase price to trailing EBITDA, for the period 1977 to the
second quarter of 2012. The source is Standard & Poor’s LCD. Average
prices rose from a low average multiple of 6.0 in 2001 to a high of 9.7
in 2007. In the ﬁrst half of 2012, average purchase multiples were still
relatively high at 8.1 times trailing EBITDA. The total funds raised
in the buyout transaction are used for the consideration to the seller
as well as underwriter fees for the LBO debt and call premiums on
existing bonds.
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1997–2Q 2012. (Source: S&P’s LCD).
The price multiples in LBOs seem to be driven more by the availabil-
ity of debt ﬁnancing than the general market conditions. Axelson et al.
(2010) investigate the determinants of LBO ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure
for a sample of 1,157 worldwide leveraged buyout deals in 1980–2008.
They ﬁnd that the leverage of LBO ﬁrms is unrelated to debt levels of
similar public ﬁrms. Instead, market-wide credit conditions, measured
as the leveraged loan spread over LIBOR, is the main driver of both
the quantity and composition of debt of the LBO ﬁrms.
Transaction price multiples are positively related to price multiples
in public markets, but also to declines in loan spreads. Interestingly,
the use of high leverage in the transactions is negatively related to
fund returns, after controlling for vintage and a variety of other char-
acteristics. Axelson et al. (2010) suggest that agency problems between
private equity fund managers and their investors allow credit conditions
to drive the use of leverage, which create a pro-cyclical pattern in lever-
aged buyout activity and at times may hurt investment performance.
Colla et al. (2011) also analyze LBO ﬁrms’ capital structure for a
worldwide sample of 238 buyouts in 1997–2008. While Axelson et al.
(2010) rely on matched public ﬁrms, the data of Colla et al. (2011)
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includes ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Consistent with prior evidence on
public ﬁrms, they ﬁnd that leverage increases with ﬁrm proﬁtability and
decreases with cash ﬂow volatility. Furthermore, in hot buyout markets,
senior lenders become more aggressive, loosening lending conditions
and crowding out junior debt.
Shivdasani and Wang (2011) show that the increased bank lend-
ing in 2004–2007 was made possible by securitization, which altered
banks’ access to capital. Banks lending to LBO ﬁrms were also active in
underwriting CLOs, often used to securitize these loans. Loans oﬀered
by originating banks had lower spreads and looser covenant protec-
tion. Also, LBO deals funded by these banks relied more on bank debt
than deals funded by other banks. Although ﬁnancing costs were lower,
there is little evidence that CLOs were used to fund lower-quality deals.
Target ﬁrms in CLO driven deals generated more free cash ﬂows and
were substantially larger than other deals. Thus, it appears that a
primary impact of the CLO channel of funding was to facilitate the
ﬁnancing of much larger LBOs. See also Roden and Lewellen (1995)
for further empirical analysis of the structure of the LBO ﬁnancing
package and Axelson et al. (2009) for a theoretical model explaining
the ﬁnancial structure of buyout ﬁrms.
Haddad et al. (2011) introduce the possibility of time variation in
investors’ discount rates, which alter the value of agency costs plaguing
the public ﬁrm. They identify 756 buyout transactions in a quarterly
panel of public ﬁrms from 1980 to 2009. Using pooled probit regres-
sions, they ﬁnd that the likelihood of a ﬁrm going private increases
in the risk-free rate and decreases in expected market returns. Inter-
estingly, after controlling for the risk-free rate and the market risk
premia, speciﬁc variables capturing credit market conditions cannot
predict LBO activity. In the cross section, ﬁrms with lower market
beta, lower non-systematic risk (measured as the standard deviation
of the residual from the market model), and lower cash-ﬂow volatility
are more likely to become LBO targets, perhaps because these ﬁrms
have more capacity for high debt. See also Cao et al. (2010) for a cross-
country examination of LBO activity and creditor rights.
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8.3 Value Creation in LBOs
The total value created in a leveraged buyout is divided between the
selling shareholders and the LBO investors. Table 8.1 shows the premi-
ums paid in 1,058 leveraged buyout transactions between 1973 and 2006
as reported by seven selected studies. The premium is deﬁned as the
ﬁnal oﬀer price in excess of the target stock price 20–60 days prior to the
announcement of the bid. As shown in the table, the average premium
ranges from 27% to 59% across the seven studies, with a sample-size-
weighted average of 37%. The median premium ranges from 27% to
42%, with an average of 32%. It appears that premiums are generally
somewhat lower in the 2000s compared to the 1980s. The exception
is the study by Renneboog et al. (2007) of 177 buyouts in the United
Kingdom between 1997 and 2003. They document an average premium
of 40% (median 38%), which is higher than the contemporaneous LBO
premiums of 27–29% in the United States (Guo et al., 2011).
Several studies ﬁnd two-day average CARs of 16–17% for LBO
announcements in the 1980s (DeAngelo et al., 1984; Lehn and Poulsen,
Table 8.1. Premiums paid in 1,058 leverage buyouts for seven selected studies from 1973
to 2006.
The premium is the ratio between the ﬁnal oﬀer price and the pre-buyout stock price less
one.
Premium
Type of Sample Time Day of pre-buyout
Study Mean Median deal size period stock price
DeAngelo et al.
(1984)
59% LBO 23 1973–1980 −40
Lehn and Poulsen
(1989)
36% LBO 257 1980–1987 −20
Kaplan (1989b) 46% 42% MBO 76 1980–1985 −40
Harlow and Howe
(1993)
45% LBO 121 1980–1989 −20
Renneboog et al.
(2007)
40% 38% LBO 177 1997–2003 −40
Billet et al. (2010) 27% 27% LBO 212 1990–2006 −60
Guo et al. (2011) 29% LBO 192 1996–2006 −20
Sample-size
weighted average
37% 32% 1,058 1973–2006
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1989; Slovin et al., 1991; Van de Gucht and Moore, 1998). For a sample
of 641 proposed LBOs in 1980–2001, Brown et al. (2009) estimate an
average announcement CAR of 19%. Studying 115 buyout transactions
in Europe, 1997–2005, Andres et al. (2007) report a two-day announce-
ment return of 13%. The announcement return reﬂects a combination
of the market’s estimate of the target gains from a deal and the likeli-
hood that the deal succeeds. In a sample of large corporate asset sales
1994–2004, Hege et al. (2011) show that sellers have higher announce-
ment returns when the buyer is a private equity fund rather than a
strategic buyer.3 Overall, the target shareholders tend to make sub-
stantial gains in leveraged buyouts.
The second part of the equation is the returns realized by the LBO
investors. These returns have been diﬃcult to estimate since the buyout
targets are taken private and often do not return to public ownership.
Kaplan (1989a) estimates a median market-adjusted return of 28%
(mean 42%) for investors in 25 MBOs that went public after on aver-
age 2.7 years. Muscarella and Versuypens (1990) examine the equity
returns for 58 LBO ﬁrms that returned to public status after on average
2.9 years. Comparing the IPO price with the LBO price, they estimate
an average annualized rate of raw return of 268%. This return is, how-
ever, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the return of a hypothetical levered
portfolio of S&P500 ﬁrms.
More recently, LBO fund quarterly cash ﬂow has been available
through self-reporting to Venture Economics by private equity ﬁrms
and their limited partners.4 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use this data to
investigate the returns in 1980–2001 for 169 LBO funds raised before
1996. Net of fees, the median fund is estimated to underperform the
stock market index, generating only 80% (mean 97%) of the return on
the S&P500. However, the heterogeneity in performance across funds is
large. For the subset of sponsors that have been around for at least ﬁve
years, the median net-of-fee performance exceeds the S&P500 by 50%
(mean 80%). Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show that this performance is
3See also Gorbenko and Malenko (2010) for a structural model of takeover auctions with
asymmetries in the valuation of the target across strategic and ﬁnancial bidders.
4This database is also referred to as Thompson Venture Expert.
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persistent, and suggest that LBO sponsors may have diﬀerent skills in
managing portfolio companies.
Phallipou and Gottschalg (2009) study the same data set through a
slightly extended time period. Speciﬁcally, they examine the cash ﬂow
data in 1980–2002 for 238 funds raised 1993 or earlier. Supporting the
results in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), total net-of-fee cash distributions
to investors are surprisingly low. The median cash return is 1.6 times
the paid-in capital for U.S. focused funds and 1.2 times paid-in capital
for funds focused on buyouts in the European Union. Phallipou and
Gottschalg (2009) further try to correct for the large number of funds in
VentureXpert, an investment-oriented database, that are not included
in Venture Economics. After this correction, they estimate an average
annual fund alpha of −3% for a combined sample of buyout and venture
funds. That is, assuming a fund beta of one, the average private equity
fund underperforms the S&P500 by as much as 3% per year.
Driessen et al. (2011) explore the risk and return characteristics of
buyout investments. They develop a GMM-style methodology to esti-
mate the abnormal performance and risk exposure of the funds’ net-of-
fee distributions. The data set includes the actual cash ﬂows through
2003 reported in Venture Economics for 272 buyout funds raised in 1980–
1993. Their estimations produce a buyout fundmarket beta of a low 0.33
and an alpha close to zero. Interestingly, while fund alpha is unrelated
to size, the beta is signiﬁcantly positively related to size. Thus, the per-
sistently higher return of large funds documented by Kaplan and Schoar
(2005) could be explained by higher risk rather than superior abnormal
performance. Using a diﬀerent mimicking portfolio technique, Groh and
Gottschalg (2011) also document a low beta of buyout funds.
Recent papers cast doubt on the quality of the data in Venture
Economics. Stucke (2011) suggests that this database systematically is
missing information on cash distributions and fails to update residual
values, which leads to a downward bias in performance estimations.
Harris et al. (2011) compare fund performance across several diﬀer-
ent data sets and conclude that Venture Economics seems to under-
state the returns for buyout funds. Thus, papers using other sources of
data may provide more reliable information about private equity fund
performance.
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Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) examine a hand-collected data set
of 321 buyout investments in the United Kingdom that were exited
between 1995 and 2004. They document an average internal rate of
return (IRR) on the equity investment of 70%, adjusted for the return
of the FTSE 100 index on the London Stock Exchange. The variation
between individual investments is large, and the median index-adjusted
return is −18%. At a fund level, however, the size of each individual
investment matters. Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) show that, in
the cross section, the larger investments tend to have higher returns.
Thus, their evidence suggests that buyout index-adjusted fund returns
are positive, at least before accounting for sponsor fees. Using pro-
prietary data on cash inﬂows and outﬂows from a large institutional
investor invested in 54 U.S. LBO funds raised between 1981 and 1993,
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) also ﬁnd positive fund returns. They
report that buyout funds typically outperform the stock market, gen-
erating a risk-adjusted excess return (alpha) of 5% annually.
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) use sponsor estimates of value
changes to analyze quarterly returns of 379 LBO funds formed between
1980 and 1999. Measuring fund performance with a Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model, their estimations yield buyout fund alphas
that are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, Cumming and
Walz (2010) caution in interpreting fund returns based on unrealized
valuation estimates. They study whether private equity fund managers
tend to report inﬂated valuation estimates of portfolio companies that
have not yet been realized. The sample is large, including cash ﬂow data
for over 5,000 portfolio companies of 221 private equity funds across
39 countries in the period 1971–2003, one-quarter of which are buyout
funds. Comparing realized returns with previously reported returns,
Cumming and Walz (2010) show systematic upward biases in the self-
reported returns.
Higson and Stucke (2011) examine a large proprietary database of
fund cash ﬂows, covering 85% of all funds raised by the U.S. buy-
out industry. Their evidence indicates that the buyout industry signif-
icantly has outperformed the S&P500. Funds liquidated in the period
1980–2000 generated excess returns of on average 4.5% per year. The
cross sectional variation is large, with just over 60% of the funds
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outperforming the stock-market index, and the top decile driving the
positive average returns. Analyzing individual fund data from Burgiss
that is self-reported by limited partners, Harris et al. (2011) ﬁnd that
the median and average buyout fund have outperformed public mar-
kets. Moreover, using fund data from a large limited partner, Robinson
and Sensoy (2011a) also document returns exceeding public market
indexes for the 1990s vintage buyout funds.
Finally, Phalippou (2012) explores public data from Preqin, which
contains the cash ﬂows for 392 U.S. buyout funds. He ﬁnds that these
funds outperform the Vanguard S&P500 index fund by on average 5.7%
per annum. However, after adjusting for risk factors related to the small
size of the portfolio companies, the value premium and leverage, the
average annual fund alpha is negative (−3.1%).
Overall, the total gains from LBOs are large, manifested in the sub-
stantial premiums paid to target shareholders. However, the evidence
is inconclusive as to whether selling shareholders largely capture all the
gains in leveraged buyouts. Depending on the sample, the benchmark
portfolio, and assumptions about the value of assets that are not liqui-
dated, the estimates of LBO fund abnormal returns range from positive
to negative.
8.4 Drivers of Value Creation in LBOs
8.4.1 Operating Eﬃciency
Jensen (1986) argues that entrenched managers prefer to overinvest
rather than pay out the ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow as dividends. Increasing the
ﬁrm’s debt, without retaining the proceeds, reduces the overinvestment
problem by precommitting future cash ﬂow to be paid out in the form
of interest. In addition, the increased risk of ﬁnancial distress helps
motivate managers to operate the ﬁrm eﬃciently. In sum, by limiting
managerial discretion, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash ﬂow.
As argued by Jensen (1986), the high leverage in buyouts may result
in improved managerial investment decisions for ﬁrms with high cash
ﬂow and few growth opportunities. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) examine
263 LBOs in the 1980s. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high levels of free
cash ﬂow are more likely to go private and that acquisition premiums
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increase with the target ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. They conclude that the mit-
igation of agency problems associated with free cash ﬂow is a major
source of buyout gains. Opler and Titman (1993) provide additional
evidence showing that LBO targets have a combination of high cash
ﬂow and unfavorable investment opportunities (low q), and are more
diversiﬁed than ﬁrms that do not become targets. Also, Bae and Simet
(1998) ﬁnd that LBO announcement returns are increasing in the free
cash ﬂow of the target ﬁrm.
There is some evidence that buyouts are less likely for ﬁrms with
high expenditures for research and development (R&D). Long and
Ravenscraft (1993) show that LBOs typically target ﬁrms with R&D
expenditures below the industry average. Servaes (1994), however,
fails to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the capital expenditure level
between target ﬁrms in 99 going private transactions and their industry
peers.
Harford and Kolasinski (2011) suggest that private equity sponsors
add value by reducing overinvestment and making ﬁnancing of invest-
ments available in years where public ﬁrms are cash constrained. For
a sample of 388 ﬁrms bought out with public debt in 1996–2006, they
document greater improvements in portfolio company return on assets
than that of public industry peers. The level of capital expenditures
unrelated to investment opportunities, measured by sales growth and
industry market-to-book ratio, declines relative to rivals. Moreover, rel-
ative to the control group, portfolio companies’ capital expenditures are
less sensitive to operating losses. Overall, the evidence suggests that the
potential for incentive realignment in ﬁrms with high levels of free cash
ﬂow represents an important factor in the leveraged buyout decision.
If leverage successfully curbs overinvestment, this should show in
the post-buyout operating performance. Kaplan (1989a) examines the
performance of 48 large management buyouts between 1980 and 1986.
He shows that the ﬁrms experience substantial increases in operating
income (+42%), reductions in capital expenditure, and improvements
of the net cash ﬂow (+96%) over a three-year period following the buy-
out. Smith (1990) also reports signiﬁcant performance improvements
for 58 management buyouts in 1977–1986. She ﬁnds that operating
returns, measured as operating cash ﬂow per employee and per dollar
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of operating assets, increase signiﬁcantly from the year prior to the year
after the buyout. She examines changes in accounting line items and
ﬁnds no evidence that repair and maintenance expenditures are post-
poned or the R&D expenditures are reduced. Instead, the higher mar-
gins are a result of adjustments in the management of working capital.
Several other studies document improved operating eﬃciency after
buyouts. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) examine data from the Longi-
tudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S. Bureau of the Census for
131 LBOs in the period 1981–1986, with a total of 1,132 plants. They
show that plant total factor productivity (TFP) increases more than
the industry average in the years following a leveraged buyout. Consis-
tent with this, Harris et al. (2005) ﬁnd an above-industry increase in
TFP for U.K. MBO plants in the 1990s. Moreover, Muscarella and Ver-
suypens (1990) examine the performance of 72 LBO ﬁrms that went
public again. They show that LBO ﬁrms reduce operating costs and
experience signiﬁcant improvements in their operating margins. Also,
while there is a dramatic increase in leverage upon completion of the
LBO, the debt ratios are gradually reduced before returning to public
ownership.
The evidence of improvements in operating performance is weaker
for more recent transactions. Guo et al. (2011) examine 192 U.S.
public-to-private LBOs between 1990 and 2006, 94 of which have post-
transaction data. They ﬁnd that post-buyout improvements in operat-
ing performance are comparable to or slightly exceed benchmark ﬁrms
matched on industry and pre-buyout characteristics. The cash ﬂow
improvements are greater for ﬁrms with higher increase in leverage
and when the CEO is replaced in the buyout transaction. Moreover,
the median risk-adjusted return to LBO investors are 41% (average
63%). Interestingly, the cash ﬂow improvements and returns to capital
are strongly related. However, due to the small magnitude of the cash
ﬂow gains, Guo et al. (2011) suggest that recent transactions may be
motivated by other considerations than improving the operating eﬃ-
ciency of underperforming ﬁrms. Providing further support for this
conjecture, Cohn et al. (2011) ﬁnd little evidence of improvements in
operating performance after an LBO, using corporate tax return data
for 317 U.S. public companies that went private between 1995 and 2007.
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Similarly, for a sample of 35 successful public-to-private transactions
in 1998–2006, III Bartlett and Poulsen (2010) show a reduced focus
on improving portfolio company operating proﬁtability. Instead, buy-
out funds increasingly seek to increase equity returns by implementing
strategies that aggressively grow revenues and capitalize on favorable
conditions in the capital markets.
However, the evidence suggests that European buyouts still generate
improvements in operating performance. Cressy et al. (2007) compare
the operating performance of private equity-backed LBOs with that of
comparable non-buyout private ﬁrms matched on industry and size.
Their sample is 122 U.K. buyouts in 1995–2002. They ﬁnd a higher
post-buyout operating proﬁtability for the LBO ﬁrms, and particu-
larly when the sponsor specializes in the target ﬁrm industry. Acharya
et al. (2011) study 395 leverage buyout transactions in Western Europe
sponsored by large private equity ﬁrms during 1997–2001, and compare
them with publicly traded peers. They estimate that 20% in deal IRR,
or one-third of the gross IRR of the portfolio companies, is abnormal
performance (adjusted for the higher leverage). During private equity
ownership, the average operating performance increases by 0.4% per
annum above industry median. Also, a stronger operating improve-
ment is associated with higher abnormal IRR and private equity part-
ners with strong operational background. Boucly et al. (2011) further
document an increase in operating proﬁtability for a large sample of
French LBO ﬁrms compared to their controls. This evidence is con-
sistent with private equity sponsors creating value through operating
improvements. See also Achleitner et al. (2011) for further evidence on
multiples and operating performance improvements of buyout ﬁrms.
There is a concern that the trimmed organization and reduced capi-
tal expenditure may hurt the long-term prospects of LBO ﬁrms. Lerner
et al. (2011) study a sample of 472 LBO ﬁrms that received private
equity backing between 1986 and 2005 and ﬁled at least one successful
patent application through May 2007. They show that ﬁrms continue
to pursue high-impact patents after going private, concentrating their
innovations in areas of historical core strengths. They conclude that
leveraged buyouts promote a beneﬁcial refocusing of the ﬁrm’s patent
portfolios. In a diﬀerent study of 681 private ﬁrms in Western Europe
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that were acquired by private equity funds in the period 1998–2004,
Ughetto (2010) ﬁnds an increase in the number of successful patent
applications after the buyout. Moreover, Barrot (2012) examines the
impact of the horizon of private equity funds on their investment strate-
gies. He ﬁnds that funds with longer remaining investment horizon tend
to select younger, earlier-stage ﬁrms and hold on to them longer.
Overall, the results suggest that buyout funds target ﬁrms with
free cash ﬂow, where the leverage could help improve investment deci-
sions by reducing managers’ discretionary funds. There is convincing
evidence of post-buyout improvements in operating performance and
plant productivity. Also, while total capital expenditures decline, crit-
ical investments in R&D seem to continue.
8.4.2 Employment
It appears that the improvements in operating eﬃciency are associ-
ated with employee layoﬀs. Kaplan (1989a) ﬁnds that the median ﬁrm
reduces its employee count by 12% relative to the industry from the
year prior to the year after the buyout. Muscarella and Versuypens
(1990) show that the average employment declines by 0.6% for LBO
ﬁrms that subsequently went public. This job creation is in the bot-
tom 10% of COMPUSTAT ﬁrms. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report
that white collar compensation and employment decline in the years
following the buyout. Moreover, for a sample of 33 LBOs in 1980–1984,
Liebeskind et al. (1992) report that LBO ﬁrms downsize the operations
more than comparable ﬁrms in terms of number of employees, plants,
and total revenues. In addition, there is some evidence that buyouts in
the United Kingdom lead to modest declines in employment (Wright
et al., 1992; Amess and Wright, 2007; Cressy et al., 2011).
More recent evidence, however, suggests that the decline in LBO
employment in existing facilities is outweighed by additional employ-
ment in new establishments, deﬁned as new plants, oﬃces, and retail
outlets. Davis et al. (2011) examine LBD data for 3,200 U.S. ﬁrms
acquired in private equity transactions between 1980 and 1995 and
150,000 U.S. establishments operated by these ﬁrms. Consistent with
previous work, they ﬁnd that employment drops more in existing target
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establishments than at control ﬁrm establishments following the buy-
out. The diﬀerence is 3% of initial employment over two years and 6%
over ﬁve years. Also, target-ﬁrm employment losses are much greater in
public-to-private transactions than other leveraged buyouts. However,
the LBO ﬁrms create substantially more jobs in new establishments
than do their peers. They conclude that the private equity sponsors
push the target ﬁrm to expand in new, higher-value directions. Over-
all, while LBO ﬁrms appear to trim their workforce to improve eﬃ-
ciency in existing production facilities, they also create additional job
opportunities through new establishments.
There is also some evidence that private target ﬁrms experience
more growth than ﬁrms that were public prior to the leveraged buyout.
Examining a sample of 839 French buyouts in 1994–2004, Boucly et al.
(2011) ﬁnd that employment, assets, and sales grow much more rapidly
at portfolio ﬁrms than at their control ﬁrms. Interestingly, this growth
is concentrated to ﬁrms that were private prior to the takeover, and
where the seller was an individual or family cashing out. Since these
ﬁrms may have been credit constrained prior to the takeover, it appears
that private equity funds help portfolio companies get access to growth
capital. This inference is supported by Chung (2011), who documents
positive industry-adjusted growth rates in employment, assets, sales,
and capital expenditures for a large sample of U.K. private-to-private
buyouts between 1997 and 2006.
8.4.3 Corporate Governance
Highly leveraged transactions lead to increased monitoring by banks
and the LBO sponsor, whose compensation is a direct function of the
success of the investment. Jensen (1989) argues that the combination
of active governance by buyout sponsors, high-powered managerial
incentives, and pressure from high leverage provide a corporate gover-
nance system and incentive structure that is superior to that of public
ﬁrms with dispersed ownership. He predicts that the LBO organization
eventually will eclipse the traditional, widely held public companies
to become the dominant organizational form. While this has not yet
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happened, there is little doubt that the LBO organization carries with
it a relatively eﬃcient governance structure.
A central governance characteristic of leveraged buyouts is a mean-
ingful management equity participation. Kaplan (1989a) shows that
the median equity ownership of the top management team increases
from 6% to 23% for 76 MBOs in the 1980s. Moreover, Muscarella and
Versuypens (1990) report that the most highly paid oﬃcer owns 18%
of the LBO ﬁrm’s equity prior to an IPO exit.
The equity ownership of the top management team is substantial
also in more recent samples. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) study 45
LBOs from 1996 to 2004. They ﬁnd a median equity ownership of 6%
for the CEO and 16% for the management team. Nikoskelainen and
Wright (2007) report an average equity ownership of 37% (median 35%)
for 321 U.K. buyouts over the 1995–2004 period. Acharya and Kehoe
(2008) examine a sample of 59 large buyouts in the United Kingdom
between 1997 and 2004. They document an equity ownership including
options of 3% for the CEO and 13% for the top management team
as a whole. In sum, leveraged buyouts provide signiﬁcant equity-based
incentives to top management that help align managerial incentives
with shareholders’ interests.5
The concentration of ownership further provides LBO sponsors
with a strong incentive to monitor the ﬁrm closely. In the model of
Edmans (2011), the concentrated ownership induces equity-holders to
learn more about the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. This protects skilled managers
from being ﬁred when good long-term projects return low short-term
earnings, thus increasing investment eﬃciency.
Baker III and Wruck (1990) provide a detailed description of the
organizational changes at O.M. Scott after its leveraged buyout in 1986.
The board had ﬁve members, of which one was a manager and three
represented the buyout sponsor. All board members owned stock. The
board met quarterly, and an executive committee monthly. More impor-
tantly, one of the private equity partners served as a liaison between
the LBO sponsor and the ﬁrm’s managers. The operating partner, who
5See also Achleitner et al. (2010) for an analysis of corporate governance motives in German
private equity investments.
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functioned as an advisor and consultant, spent several weeks at O.M.
Scott after the buyout closed and was thereafter in telephone contact
with the CEO daily. Baker III and Wruck (1990) conclude that the
close monitoring by the LBO sponsor, combined with the restrictions
imposed by the high leverage and signiﬁcant managerial shareholdings
and bonus plans, led to a substantial improvement in O.M. Scott’s oper-
ating performance and investment policies. See also Denis (1994) for
an analysis of the organizational changes at Safeway after its leveraged
buyout in 1986.
The evidence suggests that LBO sponsors are active monitors also
in more recent transactions. Cornelli and Karakas (2011) examine the
board structure for 88 U.K. leveraged buyouts sponsored by a private
equity ﬁrm over the 1998–2003 period. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes
in board size and composition when a ﬁrm goes private. Board size
generally decreases and the presence of outside directors is drastically
reduced, as they are replaced by individuals employed by the LBO
sponsors. Private equity sponsors have a larger presence on the board
in deals where the incumbent CEO is replaced or it takes more than
ﬁve years to exit the investment. Thus, it appears that private equity
sponsors sit on boards primarily when there is a need for their expertise.
Acharya et al. (2009) examine board eﬀectiveness for private equity
portfolio companies compared to that of publicly traded ﬁrms, using a
sample of 66 U.K. portfolio ﬁrms. They report that 39% of the CEOs
and 33% of the CFOs are replaced either before closure or in the ﬁrst
100 days of the deal. For a sample of U.S. buyouts in 1990–2006, Gong
and Wu (2011) ﬁnd that 51% of incumbent CEOs are replaced within
two years of the LBO announcement. Surveying over 4,000 ﬁrms world-
wide, Bloom et al. (2009) show that private equity-backed ﬁrms on
average have better management practices than ﬁrms with other types
of ownership. See also Masulis and Thomas (2009) for a discussion of
the superior corporate governance by private equity sponsors. In sum,
buyout sponsors play an important role through active monitoring of
their portfolio companies.
Kaplan et al. (2011) analyze how CEO characteristics aﬀect portfo-
lio company performance. They examine assessments of 224 candidates
hired or remaining as CEOs in private equity transactions in 2000–2006,
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performed by a ﬁrm specialized in assessing top executives. Kaplan
et al. (2011) identify two main CEO characteristics: (i) the candi-
date’s general ability and (2) his communication and interpersonal skills
relative to his execution and resoluteness skills. Performance is mea-
sured several ways, including an assessment by the private equity ﬁrm,
whether there was a favorable exit, and whether the company received
positive press on its operations or additional ﬁnancing at higher valu-
ations. In cross sectional regressions, subsequent performance is shown
to be positively related to the general ability and execution skills of the
buyout CEO.
While the monitoring by LBO sponsors is an important governance
mechanism in leveraged buyouts, managers sometime undertake MBOs
without the involvement of a private equity sponsor. Fidrmuc et al.
(2012) examine the choice between an MBO and a sponsor-backed
buyout across 129 U.K. leveraged buyouts in 1997–2003 and where
management stayed in control. They ﬁnd that MBO targets have lower
market-to-book ratios, more cash on hand, and greater managerial own-
ership. They suggest that managers invite LBO sponsors when they
need help to complete a deal, and conclude that MBOs and sponsor-
backed LBOs are complementary transactions.
Cotter and Peck (2001) analyze how the equity ownership of the
LBO ﬁrm interacts with the structure of the buyout debt. Their sam-
ple is 64 LBO ﬁrms in 1984–1989, of which a buyout specialist owns
majority control in 40 ﬁrms (63%). They ﬁnd that ﬁrms controlled
by an LBO sponsor use less short-term and/or senior bank debt to
ﬁnance the transaction. Moreover, the LBO ﬁrm’s operating perfor-
mance increases with the use of senior debt only in deals where no
buyout specialist is involved. They suggest that bank debt, having
more restrictive covenants, and debt with shorter maturity, and thus
higher debt service, both help motivate and monitor management in
the absence of an active buyout specialist. See also Grinstein (2006) for
an analysis of how the debt structure is used to commit investors to
disciplinary actions against management.
In sum, leveraged buyouts are characterized by powerful corporate
governance structures. First, management owns a substantial portion of
the equity. Second, the ownership is concentrated with an LBO sponsor
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who actively monitors management. Third, the high leverage puts addi-
tional pressure on generating cash ﬂow. Together, these mechanisms
provide compelling incentives for managers to improve the eﬃciency of
the LBO ﬁrm.
8.4.4 Wealth Transfers from Target Debtholders
If the pre-buyout bonds lack protective covenants, the LBO ﬁrm may
issue more senior debt. Bonds that lack protective covenants become
more junior in the capital structure, resulting in a reduction in the
value of those bonds. Thus, it is possible that some of the buyout gains
represent wealth transfers from target ﬁrm debtholders. Marais et al.
(1989) examine a sample of leveraged buyouts between 1974 and 1985.
They ﬁnd positive average CARs for convertible securities and preferred
stock, most of which are redeemed as part of the buyout. A majority
of the non-convertible debt claims remain outstanding without renego-
tiation after the buyout. This debt typically lacks covenants restrict-
ing additional borrowing with higher seniority and there are pervasive
downgradings of public debt following successful buyout proposals, sug-
gesting bondholder losses.
Asquith and Wizman (1990) investigate the one-month return for
199 bonds of LBO targets in the 1980s. They ﬁnd an average abnormal
return of −1% across all bonds. However, these losses are concentrated
to bonds with no covenant protection (mean return of −3%). Bonds
with strong covenant protection have insigniﬁcant returns. Overall, the
losses to bondholders are small compared to the total gains accruing
to shareholders in the same LBO. Warga and Welch (1993) document
an average risk-adjusted LBO announcement return of −7% for 36
bonds. The bond holder losses, however, constitute at most 6% of the
shareholder gains. They too conclude that bondholder expropriation is
a minor source of gains in leveraged buyouts.
Billet et al. (2010) collect information on change-in-control
covenants for a sample of 407 U.S. LBO targets, 1980–2006. A change-
in-control covenant forces a redemption of the bonds at a premium in
case of a takeover. They ﬁnd average bondholder abnormal returns of
−4.9%, consistent with earlier studies. However, splitting the sample
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based on change-in-control covenant protection, protected bonds expe-
rience positive announcement returns of 2.3%, while unprotected bonds
have negative returns of −6.8%. Interestingly, ﬁrms without change-in-
control covenants are twice as likely to become a target compared to
ﬁrms without such covenants. Billet et al. (2010) suggest that bond-
holder wealth expropriation has declined over time with an increased
use of change-in-control covenants. See also Baran and King (2010)
for additional evidence on bond holder returns in leverage buyout
transactions.
Ippolito and James (1992) propose that LBOs could extract wealth
from other stakeholders as well. They examine the termination of pen-
sion plans in 169 buyouts in the 1980s. They ﬁnd that the incidence
of pension terminations doubles following LBO announcements. How-
ever, many of these terminations are aﬃliated with plant closings or an
adaption to terms oﬀered by the competitors of the LBO ﬁrm.
Brown et al. (2009) examine the eﬀect of leveraged buyouts on the
ﬁrms’ suppliers, using a sample of 157 suppliers of ﬁrms undertaking
LBOs in 1981–2001. They document an average announcement CAR
of −1.3% for the suppliers. Moreover, the negative returns are con-
centrated to suppliers with substantial relation-speciﬁc investments.
Thus, some of the LBO gains may come from the ﬁnancial lever-
age as a commitment device in negotiations with suppliers and other
stakeholders.
Another group of stakeholders in the buyout transaction is the
LBO bank lenders. Kracaw and Zenner (1996) examine wealth eﬀects
of highly leveraged transactions on the stock prices of lead-banks of
the leveraged-loan syndicate. They ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive average
CARs of 0.5% when the transaction is announced and another 0.4%
when the bank ﬁnancing is agreed upon. Moreover, the bank stock
returns are increasing in the size of the highly leveraged transaction.
In all, bank lenders are expected to make proﬁts on ﬁnancing highly
leveraged transactions and not the opposite.
Demiroglu and James (2010) investigate how the ﬁnancial structure
of a leveraged buyout is related to the reputation of the private equity
sponsor. They examine a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs com-
pleted in 1997–2007. Demiroglu and James (2010) ﬁnd that portfolio
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companies of high-reputation sponsors pay lower bank and institutional
loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institu-
tional loans. In addition, sponsor reputation is positively related to the
amount of leverage (debt/EBITDA) used to ﬁnance the buyout, but
not to the pricing multiple. Also, reputable sponsors are more active
when credit spreads are low and bank lending standards are relatively
lax, suggesting that reputable sponsors are able to exploit favorable
credit market conditions for LBOs.
Ivashina and Kovner (2009) further study the impact on the loan
terms of LBO sponsors’ repeated lending from banks. The sample is
1,590 leveraged loans ﬁnancing private equity-sponsored LBOs between
1993 and 2005. Ivashina and Kovner (2009) show that loan spreads
decrease and maximum debt-to-EBITDA covenants increase in the
sponsor’s lending relationship with the bank and the potential for
future fee business. It is possible that the advantage from lending rela-
tionships could help explain the persistence in returns across LBO spon-
sors documented by Kaplan and Schoar (2005). See also Cao and Liu
(2012) for an analysis of shared bank relationships between the private
equity sponsor and the target ﬁrm. Overall, these results suggest that
LBO ﬁrms play an important role as ﬁnancial intermediaries, help-
ing their portfolio companies achieve leverage on better terms than as
stand-alone borrowers.
8.4.5 Target Undervaluation
Muller and Panunzi (2004) argue that the LBO sponsor can expro-
priate minority shareholders by merging the ﬁrm with the raider’s
leveraged acquisition subsidiary. Also, while managers have a ﬁduciary
duty to negotiate fair value in a buyout transaction, as acquirers of
shares, they stand to gain from a low transaction value. Thus, by
understating the true value of the target shares, they could expropriate
wealth from outside target shareholders in the buyout. The evidence on
the extent to which managers are able to manipulate the target ﬁrm’s
books and thus indirectly the oﬀer price is inconclusive. DeAngelo
(1986) examines the accounting choices of 64 NYSE ﬁrms proposing
an MBO during 1973–1982. Using a variety of tests, she fails to ﬁnd
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any evidence that managers systematically understate earnings in the
period leading up to the buyout. Perry and Williams (1994) employ a
diﬀerent methodology and a larger sample of 175 MBOs. In contrast,
they ﬁnd evidence of manipulation of discretionary accruals that
lowers the earnings in the year preceding the buyout announcement.
Similarly, Li et al. (2012) ﬁnd that target ﬁrms exhibit abnormally
high discretionary sales, general and administration (SGA) expenses
and abnormally low discretionary accruals, and losses from asset
sales in the year prior to an MBO announcement, allowing managers
to acquire the target ﬁrm relatively cheap. Further, Hafzalla (2009)
document that managers involved in MBOs, issue press releases with
more negative news just prior to the MBO transaction.
Kaplan (1989b) compares the ﬁnancial forecasts that ﬁrms present
at the time of a management buyout to subsequent performance. He
ﬁnds that the actual post-buyout performance generally lags the fore-
cast, rejecting the notion that managers capitalize on inside informa-
tion in the MBO. Lee (1992) studies a sample of withdrawn MBO
proposals to determine whether managers’ proposals reveal informa-
tion beyond the gains from the completed transaction. He ﬁnds that
stock prices drop back to their pre-bid level after the withdrawal of
the MBO proposal unless another bidder appears. He suggests that the
wealth creation in LBOs primarily results from eﬃciency gains associ-
ated with the completed transaction rather than wealth transfers from
pre-buyout shareholders. Moreover, Ofek (1994) ﬁnds that stock prices
drop back to their pre-buyout level after MBO oﬀers are canceled or
rejected by the target boards. Also, there is no subsequent improvement
in the operating performance of these ﬁrms. Overall, the evidence at
large suggests that buyout gains come from other sources than expro-
priation of selling shareholders
A relatively recent practice is the so-called “club deals”, where two
or more private equity ﬁrms jointly sponsor an LBO. The equity portion
in the 2006–2007 mega deals may have been too large for a single fund to
ﬁnance on its own. Indeed, Wu (2011) shows that the likelihood for pri-
vate equity syndication increases with investment size and geographic
distance. Stanﬁeld (2011) ﬁnds that buyout funds with a history of poor
deal performance are more likely to participate in syndicates than funds
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with a record of past success. A concern with these club deals, however,
is that LBO sponsors may collude to limit competition, hence reducing
the price paid to target shareholders. Addressing this concern, the U.S.
Department of Justice launched an inquiry in late 2006 into the eﬀect
of private equity consortiums on takeover competition.
Oﬃcer et al. (2011) examine the collusion argument for a sample of
70 club deals and 131 single-sponsor LBOs completed between 1984 and
2007. Using target abnormal return estimates, they ﬁnd that club deals
are associated with signiﬁcantly lower premiums than single-sponsor
deals. Guo et al. (2011) report that club deals are associated with
higher returns on the capital invested in the LBO. However, target
shareholder returns are also higher in club deals, rejecting the pro-
posal of lower prices. Moreover, LBO fund returns are not related to
measures of the competition in the bidding, suggesting that deals with
better ex-ante prospects attract participation by private equity consor-
tiums. Boone and Mulherin (2011) study 70 club deals and 94 single-
sponsor deals over 2003–2007. Based on SEC ﬁlings, they show that
the level of takeover competition is signiﬁcantly higher for both types
of LBO bidders compared to a control sample of takeovers. Moreover,
for a longer window that better account for diﬀerences in the takeover
process, they document target abnormal returns of similar magnitude
across the diﬀerent bidder categories. In sum, there is little evidence
that club deals limit bidder competition in LBOs at the expense of
target shareholders.6
Outside investors may play an active role in the buyout, promoting
target shareholder interests. Peck (1996) examines block trades in 111
MBO bids between 1984 and 1987. She ﬁnds that acquisitions of equity
blocks increase around MBO oﬀers, peaking three months prior to the
oﬀer. The participation of these blockholders increases the probability
that the MBO proposal fails and a rival bidder acquires the ﬁrm. For
a sample of 196 LBOs in 1990–2006, Huang (2010) ﬁnds signiﬁcant
increases in hedge fund holdings prior to the bid. He shows that the
6See Marquez and Singh (2009) for a theoretical analysis of club formation and Meuleman
et al. (2009) for evidence on club deals in the United Kingdom. Povel and Singh (2010)
model how “stapled ﬁnance” (a loan committed arranged by the seller) helps increase
bidding competition among private equity bidders in auctions.
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buyout premium is increasing in the level of hedge fund ownership in
the target ﬁrm, in particular for hedge funds with an activism agenda.
Thus, outside investors seem to play an important role in enhancing
target returns.
For a sample of 186 LBOs in 2000–2006, Acharya and Johnson
(2010) examine insider trades prior to the buyout announcement. They
show that the likelihood of insider trading in stock and options markets
increases with the number of participants in the equity syndicate. Simi-
larly, insider trading in bond markets and credit default swaps increases
in the size of the debt syndicate. This suggests that insider trading is
more likely the more people has advance knowledge of the buyout.
Recent evidence indicates that board members and their personal
social networks inﬂuence what companies become targets in private
equity transactions, which have huge value implications for target
shareholders. Stuart and Yim (2010) analyze how directors’ prior deal
exposure through other board assignments aﬀects the likelihood that a
ﬁrm is targeted in a leveraged buyout transaction. The sample consists
of all U.S. publicly traded ﬁrms in 2000–2007, of which 473 received a
buyout oﬀer. Stuart and Yim (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms are 40% more likely
to get a takeover oﬀer from a buyout fund if they have one or more
directors with prior experience of private equity deals through inter-
locking directorships. The higher takeover propensity is concentrated to
ﬁrms where these directors have positive going-private experience and
are inﬂuential on the current board. See also Becker and Pollet (2008),
Weir et al. (2008), Bharath and Dittmar (2010), and Mehran and Peri-
stiani (2010) for evidence on ﬁrms’ decision to go private through a
leveraged buyout transaction.
Target shareholders can realize a gain only if the deal is con-
summated. Cain et al. (2011) study the contract terms in 227
buyouts between 2004 and 2010, 32 of which failed for a variety of
reasons. Beginning in August 2007, 12 private equity ﬁrms strategically
defaulted on pending acquisitions of public targets that had declined
in value since the contracting date. Two contract terms predict bid-
der default during the ﬁnancial crises: (1) the $ amount of reverse
termination fee paid to the target in case of non-performance (i.e.,
failure to close the deal); and (2) the ability of the target to seek
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court enforcement of the buyout agreement, so-called “speciﬁc perfor-
mance”. Cain et al. (2011) conduct a detailed study of the 12 termi-
nated deals and document that none of them were driven by lack of
credit ﬁnancing to complete the transaction. They further show that
average reverse termination fees have doubled in size post-crisis, and are
even greater for sponsors with previous non-performance and in trans-
actions representing a larger fraction of sponsor equity. At the same
time, targets are less likely to seek third-party enforcement of the buy-
out contract and are generally of a smaller dollar size than before the
crisis. Thus, private equity sponsors and target ﬁrms appear to have
changed multiple contract terms post-crises to shift the allocation of
deal risk.
8.4.6 Taxes
Interest expenses are deductible and therefore reduce the ﬁrm’s cost
of capital. In the 1980s, management could also chose to step up the
value of the assets after the buyout, increasing depreciation deductions.
Kaplan (1989b) estimates the value of potential tax beneﬁts created in
MBOs using a range of assumptions about the marginal tax advantage
to debt and the debt retirement schedule. Depending on the assump-
tions, the median value of the tax beneﬁts from interest deductions
range from 13% to 130% of the premium paid to pre-buyout sharehold-
ers, or 5% to 53% of the market value of equity two months prior to
the buyout. He ﬁnds a strong positive correlation between the total tax
deductions and the premium, and suggests that taxes are an important
source of gains in leveraged buyouts.
Jenkinson and Stucke (2011) estimate the size of debt tax beneﬁts
for the 100 largest U.S. buyouts in 2003–2008. They report that the
size of the takeover premia is strongly correlated to the incremental
tax savings in the deal. On average, the takeover premium is around
twice the size of estimates of the capitalized tax savings. Thus, it
appears that anticipated tax savings from increased ﬁnancial lever-
age essentially are captured by selling shareholders rather than the
private equity investors. See also Schipper and Smith (1991) and New-
bould et al. (1992) for further analysis of tax deductions in leveraged
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buyouts. Jensen et al. (1989) estimate that leveraged buyouts have a
positive overall eﬀect on the tax revenue of the U.S. Treasury. Simula-
tions of the net eﬀect of leveraged buyout activity for the U.S. Treasury
are found in Chatﬁeld and Newbould (1996).
8.5 Industry Eﬀects
Slovin et al. (1991) propose that leveraged buyout announcements con-
vey private information about the future prospects of the industry.
Examining the stock price reaction of 940 industry rivals of 128 buyouts
in the 1980s, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive rival average announce-
ment CAR of 1.3%. The returns tend to be greater for rivals that are
smaller in size than the target ﬁrm. Phallipou and Gottschalg (2008)
argue that LBO announcements signal the existence of an industry-
wide agency problem, encouraging industry rivals to improve their gov-
ernance structure too. They document an increase in rival ﬁrm options
awards, director share ownership, and CEO turnover following LBO
activity. It is not clear, however, whether their results are speciﬁc to
rivals in industries with LBO activity or reﬂect a general trend in cor-
porate governance.
One of the potential costs of high leverage is that it reduces ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility and makes the LBO ﬁrm vulnerable to price competition by
rival ﬁrms. Chevalier (1995b) examines how a leveraged buyout aﬀects
the pricing behavior of the LBO ﬁrm and its rivals in a local market,
using data from the supermarket industry. She shows that prices rise
when rival ﬁrms are also highly leveraged and LBO ﬁrms have higher
prices than their competitors. However, prices fall when rival ﬁrms
have relatively low debt levels and a single competitor controls a large
market share. She ﬁnds that these low prices increase the probability
that the LBO ﬁrm will exit, and suggests that rivals attempt to prey
on LBO chains.
Phillips (1995) examine how ﬁnancial leverage interacts with prod-
uct market decisions for four diﬀerent industries where a major player
initiated a leveraged buyout. In three of the industries, characterized
by diﬃcult entry and high leverage of rival ﬁrms, prices increase and
industry output declines with the average industry debt ratio. In the
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fourth industry, characterized by low leverage of rivals and low barriers
to entry, prices fall and industry output increases with the industry
debt ratio.
Berstein et al. (2010) examine aggregate eﬀects of private equity
investments across 20 industries in 26 OECD countries between 1991
and 1997. They ﬁnd that leveraged buyout activity is associated with
faster industry growth in productivity and employment. Yet, there is
little evidence that economic ﬂuctuations in industries are exacerbated
by the presence of private equity investments.
Overall, the evidence indicates that ﬁrms’ leverage decisions aﬀect
industry pricing and output. See also Dasgupta and Titman (1998)
for an equilibrium model explaining the interaction between capital
structure and product markets, Fulghieri and Nagarajan (1996) for
a model on the strategic role of high leverage for deterring entry in
monopolistic markets, and Chevalier (1995a) for further evidence. Also,
Parsons and Titman (2008) discuss empirical studies on the interactions
between leverage and corporate strategy.
8.6 Organizational Longevity and Exit
Are leveraged buyouts a transitory structure or a sustainable corpo-
rate form that lasts over a longer period of time? Jensen (1989) argues
that the organizational form of a leveraged buyout is superior to pub-
lic ownership for ﬁrms in low-growth industries, predicting long-lived
LBO companies. In contrast, Rappaport (1990) claims that the lack of
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility will ultimately harm the buyout ﬁrm and foresees a
prompt return to the public equity markets. Kaplan (1991) examines
183 large leveraged buyouts completed between 1979 and 1986. He ﬁnds
that the median LBO target remains in private ownership for seven
years. Moreover, 45% of the LBO ﬁrms return to public ownership at
some point. In a sample of 72 reverse LBOs, i.e., LBOs that subse-
quently went public, Muscarella and Versuypens (1990) report that
the average ﬁrm remains private for three years.
Halpern et al. (1999) conjecture that there are two types of targets in
leveraged buyouts. One is the classical public target with little manage-
rial equity and high free cash ﬂow. The other is a target that performs
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poorly because the manager has too much of her wealth invested in
the ﬁrm and hence is suboptimally risk-averse. Examining 126 LBOs
in 1981–1986, they ﬁnd that their sample clusters into two groups.
The ﬁrst group has low prior managerial equity and takeover premi-
ums decrease in managerial equity. Moreover, the buyout is led by an
outside sponsor and the LBO ﬁrm is typically sold in an IPO or to
a strategic buyer. The second group has high managerial equity and
takeover premiums that increase in managerial equity. These buyouts
are led by managers and the LBO ﬁrm tends to remain private. In addi-
tion, managers in this group typically increase their ownership fraction
but decrease the dollar investment in the LBO ﬁrm. The authors sug-
gest that a partition into these two diﬀerent types of target ﬁrms better
describes the LBO population.
Stromberg (2008) studies holding periods and exits for 21,000 buy-
out transactions in 1970–2007. 17,000 (80%) of these buyouts were
backed by a ﬁnancial sponsor. Given the large number of transactions
in the 2000s, only 40% of the ﬁrms in his sample have exited. He ﬁnds
that 39% of the exits are in the form of a sale to a strategic buyer.
One-quarter of the exits are a secondary buyout, i.e., a sale to another
LBO fund — an exit form which has increased in importance over
the last decade. IPOs account for 13% of the exits. Moreover, despite
the signiﬁcant leverage used in buyouts, only 6% of exiting ﬁrms ﬁle
for bankruptcy or initiate a ﬁnancial restructuring. Stromberg (2008)
further shows that the median ﬁrm stays in LBO ownership for nine
years, and only 8% of the ﬁrms are sold within two years of the buyout.
Overall, the evidence suggests that leveraged buyouts are a long-term
organizational form for many ﬁrms.
Harford and Kolasinski (2011) examine 788 large U.S. LBO trans-
actions in 1993–2001, tracking exit status through 2009. Similar to
Stromberg (2008), 10% of the portfolio companies exit through an
IPO, 36% through a sale to a strategic buyer, 30% through a sale
to a ﬁnancial buyer and 15% end up in ﬁnancial distress. Interest-
ingly, when a sponsor sells a portfolio company to a public strategic
acquirer, the buyer’s stock price reaction is positive. Also, a purchase
from another ﬁnancial sponsor cannot help predict the subsequent type
of exit. Instead, secondary buyouts are common when the sponsor has
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held the portfolio company longer, suggesting that this type of exit is
a result of the pressure to sell rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
Wang (2011) studies a sample of 485 U.K. secondary buyouts in
1997–2008. Supporting the conjecture of Harford and Kolasinski (2011),
she ﬁnds that the likelihood of a secondary buyout exit is higher when
the debt markets oﬀer favorable conditions, when industry IPO volume
is low, and when the selling private equity ﬁrm wants to raise a new
fund. While secondary buyouts have a higher average price multiple
than ﬁrst-time buyouts, this could be explained by the favorable debt
market conditions at the time of the transaction. Bonini (2012) fails to
ﬁnd any evidence of operating performance improvements in secondary
buyouts and documents lower returns to private equity investors. See
also Achleitner and Figge (2011) for evidence on secondary buyouts.
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) study the decision to exit a buy-
out through a public oﬀering for 62 reverse LBOs in the 1980s. They
ﬁnd that the IPO coincides with a peak in the buyout ﬁrm’s operating
performance. The stock of the reverse LBOs outperforms comparison
ﬁrms, however, suggesting that the market anticipates the subsequent
decline in operating proﬁtability. They conclude that LBO ﬁrms chose
to go public when their performance is strong. Holthausen and Larcker
(1996) further show that the accounting performance of LBO ﬁrms
exceeds that of its industry rivals at the time of the IPO and for the
following four years. Chou et al. (2006) document increases in discre-
tionary accruals prior to the listings, and suggest that earnings man-
agement may explain a subsequent decline in proﬁtability.
For a sample of 594 reverse LBOs from 1981 to 2006, Cao
(2011) ﬁnd that LBO duration is negatively related to favorable IPO
market conditions. Moreover, ﬁrms with shorter LBO duration expe-
rience greater deterioration of performance and higher probability of
bankruptcy following the IPO. Cao (2011) suggests that sponsors may
seek quick cash returns from selling immature LBOs when stockmar-
ket conditions are favorable. Nevertheless, Cao and Lerner (2009) show
that the three- and ﬁve-year stock performance of reverse LBOs does
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the market. See Levis (2011) for further
evidence on the performance of reverse LBOs in the United Kingdom
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and Van de Gucht and Moore (1998) for estimates of the probability
that an LBO ﬁrm returns to public ownership.
Tykvova and Borell (2011) examine the extent to which buyout
companies become ﬁnancially distressed and go bankrupt. Their sam-
ple is 1,842 European buyouts in 2000–2008 and matched control
ﬁrms. Importantly, private equity-backed companies have no higher
bankruptcy ﬁling rates than do the non-buyout companies. In fact,
when the private equity sponsor is “experienced” — i.e., has carried
out a buyout transaction before — the probability of bankruptcy ﬁling
is even lower. Wilson and Wrigth (2011) conﬁrm the result that pri-
vate equity-backed ﬁrms have no diﬀerent failure rates in a large sam-
ple of U.K. ﬁrms over the period 1995–2010. See also Halpern et al.
(2009) for further evidence on the determinants of ﬁnancial distress
and bankruptcy in the cross section of highly levered transactions.
Hotchkiss et al. (2011) study 2,156 U.S. ﬁrms that obtained leverage
loan ﬁnancing between 1997 and 2010, 991 of which were private equity-
backed at some point during the sample period. Similar to the evidence
from Europe, they ﬁnd that the likelihood of default is no higher for
buyout ﬁrms than other ﬁrms when controlling for leverage. However,
conditional on default, the portfolio companies are restructured in a
shorter time and are more likely to emerge as an independent company
versus being sold or liquidated. This is particularly the case for the ﬁrms
owned by private equity funds that are older and larger, and with more
cash. Overall, it appears that buyout sponsors help facilitate eﬃcient
restructurings once a portfolio company defaults.
9Conclusions
In this survey, we review the extensive academic literature on corpo-
rate breakup transactions and highly leveraged transactions such as
LBOs. For each individual transaction, we survey the transaction pro-
cedure transaction volume, valuation eﬀects, and potential sources of
restructuring gains. We begin with corporate breakups and continue
with highly leveraged transactions, of which the LBO is the most impor-
tant category.
Corporate breakup transactions are optimal when the separation of
the diversiﬁed ﬁrm’s divisions increases ﬁrm value. The breakup trans-
actions range from divestitures and spinoﬀs, which entirely separates
a subsidiary from its parent, to equity carveouts and tracking stock,
which preserves some parent control. LBOs and other highly leveraged
recapitalizations result in the ﬁrm taking on substantial additional debt
in its capital structure.
A divestiture is a sale of a division or subsidiary in a private trans-
action. Asset sales generate cash to the parent ﬁrm on the one hand,
but trigger a capital gains tax on the other. The average parent ﬁrm
experiences an abnormal stock return of 1.2% and the average buyer a
CAR of 1.2% when a divestiture is announced. These valuation eﬀects
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have several explanations: (1) Most divestitures involve divisions that
are unrelated to the parent ﬁrm, increasing the corporate focus of
the diversiﬁed ﬁrm. (2) The parent ﬁrm’s investment decisions tend
to improve after the divestiture. (3) Assets are often transferred to a
higher-valuation buyer. (4) It appears that managers are reluctant to
sell assets, managers in ﬁrms with better corporate governance make
better divestment decisions, and the retention of proceeds is associated
with ineﬃcient investments.
A spinoﬀ is the separation of a subsidiary through a distribution
of the stock to parent shareholders. Spinoﬀs can be completed without
any tax implications, but also do not generate any cash to the parent.
The parent stock price increases by 3.3% on average at the announce-
ment of a spinoﬀ. The value creation comes from (1) increased corpo-
rate focus; (2) elimination of cross-subsidization leading to improved
investment decisions; (3) reduced information asymmetries; and (4) a
higher probability of becoming a target. Investors rebalance their port-
folios when the parent and subsidiary stocks start trading separately.
Moreover, parent managers design the subsidiary corporate charter to
include more takeover defenses compared to the parent ﬁrm itself as
well as other IPO ﬁrms.
An equity carveout is a partial IPO of the subsidiary, where the
parent typically retains a controlling stake. It generates cash (the IPO
proceeds) but no tax. The average parent ﬁrm experiences an abnormal
stock return of 1.8% at the announcement of an equity carveout. The
gains in equity carveouts are attributed to (1) an increase in corporate
focus and (2) a reduction of the ﬁnancing costs for high-growth sub-
sidiaries. Equity carveouts are a temporary organizational form, and
most carveouts are subsequently reacquired or sold oﬀ. It is possible
that the carveout generates information about the value of the sub-
sidiary as an independent company, improving the decision to exercise
the option to sell out or buy back the subsidiary.
Tracking stock is a separate class of common stock in the parent
company, tracking the performance of a given division. The tracking
stock generates cash if it is oﬀered to the public and has no tax implica-
tion. The average parent CAR is 3.0% on the announcement of a track-
ing stock issue. These announcement returns are, however, diﬃcult to
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explain beyond an initial market infatuation with yet another breakup
transaction. The tracking stock is a “quasi-pure” play in that it requires
separate divisional SEC ﬁlings, but has voting rights in the parent. In
fact, tracking stock trades like its corporate sibling divisions rather
than its industry. It lends itself for expropriation since the corporate
board, without legal remedy, can transfer funds from the tracked divi-
sion to the rest of the company. As a result of such expropriation, most
tracking stock issues have been dissolved.
A leveraged recapitalization is a large special dividend ﬁnanced by
debt, substantially increasing the ﬁrm’s leverage. The average abnormal
stock return is 5% on the announcement of a leveraged recapitalization
and 20–30% through closing of the transaction. The gains in lever-
aged recapitalizations are attributed primarily to the incentive eﬀects
of debt: recap ﬁrms substantially cut their capital expenditures and
increase operating proﬁtability.
A leveraged buyout is an acquisition by private investors ﬁnanced
primarily by debt. Premiums paid to target shareholders in LBOs aver-
age 37%, and announcement CARs average 16–17%. The LBO gains
are attributed to several sources: (1) improved investment and operat-
ing eﬃciencies; (2) increased equity-based incentives to management;
and (3) strong monitoring by the LBO sponsor. Buyouts after the turn
of the century appear to have somewhat less improvements in operat-
ing eﬃciency, but in general create value similar to LBOs of the 1980s.
Recent developments include club deals (consortiums of LBO sponsors
bidding together), fund-to-fund exits (LBO funds selling the portfo-
lio ﬁrm to another LBO fund in a secondary buyout), a leveraged loan
market that is highly liquid, and evidence of persistence in fund returns
(perhaps because brand sponsors borrow at better rates).
In this monograph, we have primarily focused on the individual
transactions and their associated empirical evidence. This is also how
most of the literature progresses. A major drawback of this approach is
the resulting lack of analysis of alternatives. That is, when a company
self-selects a divestiture, what were reasonable alternative strategies?
In what sense was divestiture superior to, say, a spinoﬀ or an equity
carveout? In what sense was going private via an LBO superior to a
leveraged recapitalization, where the ﬁrm levers up without a change
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of control? Are there systematic diﬀerences between public-to-private
LBO transactions and private-to-private restructurings?
Ideally, one would use a theoretical model to structure the answers
to these types of questions. The perhaps greatest challenge to the
restructuring literature is to achieve a modicum of integration of
the analysis across transaction types. Also, it is diﬃcult to evaluate
the expected return from buyout investments with only limited data
on portfolio companies that do not return to public status within the
sample period. We expect these issues to be resolved as both theories
and data become more readily available in the future.
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